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ABBOTT v. ABBOTT: REVIVING GOOD FAITH AND  
REJECTING AMBIGUITY IN TREATY JURISPRUDENCE 
MOLLY K. MADDEN∗
 
 
In Abbott v. Abbott,1 the Supreme Court of the United States con-
sidered whether ne exeat rights2 constitute rights of custody under the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduc-
tion3 (“the Hague Convention”).4  The Court held that ne exeat rights, 
which require parental consent when another parent removes a child 
abroad, are in fact rights of custody.  Therefore, the non-removing 
parent had a right to seek a return remedy—that is, the return of the 
child to his habitual country of residence.5
Abbott reveals two significant points for treaty interpretation and 
one missed opportunity.  First, Abbott suggests that the post-Rehnquist 
Court is reviving the canons of good faith and liberal interpretation, 
  Abbott, as the post-
Rehnquist Court’s first case dedicated to treaty interpretation, pro-
vides a glimpse into the Court’s evolving approach to treaty interpre-
tation.  As lower courts wrestle with increasing numbers of treaty cas-
es, such a glimpse is invaluable. 
 
Copyright © 2012 by Molly K. Madden. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  
Thank you to the excellent editorial staff of the 2010–11 and 2011–12 Maryland Law Re-
view, particularly Kathleen Harne whose thoughtful and positive comments guided me 
through my early efforts.  Thank you also to Professor Michael Van Alstine, who graciously 
provided insightful comments and direction when I faltered midway.  Finally, thank you, 
as always, to Dan Amon and his endless supply of tough love, patience, and unfaltering 
support.  Any errors are mine alone. 
 1. 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 2. Id. at 1987 (recognizing a ne exeat right in the family law context as “the authority 
to consent before the other parent may take the child to another country”).  See also Gon-
zalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002) (defining a ne exeat clause as a 
“writ which forbids the person to whom it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or 
the jurisdiction of the court” (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).  
This term originates from the phrase “ne exeat regno,” which translates to “let him not go 
out of the kingdom.”  WEBSTER’S REVISED UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 968 (1913). 
 3. Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, Oct. 25, 
1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, 1343 U.N.T.S. 89 [hereinafter Hague Convention]. 
 4. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1987. 
 5. Id. at 1997. 
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treaty-interpretation doctrines that had been ignored for nearly se-
venty years.6  Second, the Abbott decision rejects ambiguity as a trigger 
for reference to extratextual sources as aids in interpretation.7  Third, 
the Abbott Court missed an opportunity to clarify the distinction be-
tween treaty and statutory interpretation and inform lower court ad-
judication of treaty cases.8
 
    
I.  THE CASE 
On August 26, 2005, Jacquelyn Abbott removed her son, A.J., 
from their residence in Chile and took him to the United States with-
out the knowledge or consent of A.J.’s father, Timothy Abbott.9  The 
Abbotts had separated in March 2003 after ten years of marriage.10  At 
the time of their separation, Mr. and Ms. Abbott lived in La Serena, 
Chile.11  A Chilean family court awarded to Ms. Abbott “daily care and 
control” of A.J. and to Mr. Abbott “specific direct and regular visita-
tion rights.”12  On January 13, 2004, the Chilean court granted Ms. 
Abbott’s request for a ne exeat order, which prohibited either parent 
from removing A.J. from Chile without the other parent’s consent.13  
This order supplemented the ne exeat right already imposed by a Chi-
lean family-law statute.14  Ms. Abbott subsequently removed A.J. from 
Chile without Mr. Abbott’s consent.15
Mr. Abbott located A.J. in Texas with the help of a private inves-
tigator.
 
16
 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
  He then filed suit in U.S. federal court and requested that 
 7. See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.C. 
 9. Abbott v. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 542 F.3d 1081 
(5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 10. Id.  Mr. Abbott is a British citizen, while Ms. Abbott is a U.S. citizen.  Abbott v. Ab-
bott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).  Their son, A.J., was 
born in Hawaii in 1995.  Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637. 
 11. Id.  The Abbotts began their residence in Serena, Chile, in 2002.  Id.     
 12. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted).  The Chilean 
court granted Mr. Abbott visitation rights in January 2004.  Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1082.  In a 
November 2004 order, the court granted all custody rights to Ms. Abbott and denied Mr. 
Abbott’s request for custody rights.  Id.  In February 2005, Mr. Abbott’s visitation rights 
were expanded by court order to include visitation for a month during summer vacation.  
Id. 
 13. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637.   
 14.  See id. at 638 n.3 (recognizing “the statute does not confer rights distinguishable in 
any significant way from those conferred by the Chilean court’s ne exeat order”).   
 15. Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1082.  Ms. Abbott removed A.J. while motions were pending in 
the Chilean family court.  Id.   
 16. Id.  
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A.J. be returned to Chile because his removal constituted a “wrongful 
removal” under the Hague Convention, which governs international 
child abduction.17  The district court in Texas denied Mr. Abbott’s 
request, finding that the Chilean court’s ne exeat order did not grant 
Mr. Abbott custody rights.18
This finding proved fatal to Mr. Abbott’s contention that A.J.’s 
removal was “wrongful” under the Hague Convention.
   
19  The district 
court emphasized that the Hague Convention establishes two kinds of 
rights: custody rights and access rights.20  Only custody rights, the 
court held, may result in a “wrongful removal” under the Hague Con-
vention and provide a remedy of a court-ordered return to the coun-
try of habitual residence.21  The court also stated that the majority of 
federal courts deciding similar cases had held that a ne exeat order 
does not constitute a right of custody under the Hague Convention.22
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that ne 
exeat rights are not rights of custody.
  
23  The Fifth Circuit, like the dis-
trict court, identified the dispositive question to be whether Mr. Ab-
bott possessed “rights of custody” under the Hague Convention.24  To 
answer that question, the court examined the split in the circuits25 
and compared the Second Circuit’s decision that ne exeat rights are 
not rights of custody under the Hague Convention with the Eleventh 
Circuit’s decision that a “ne exeat right . . . is sufficient to constitute a 
custody right.”26
 
 17. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 637–38.     
  The Fifth Circuit also noted disagreement among 
 18. Id. at 641.  However, the court noted in its denial that it “in no way condones Ms. 
Abbott’s action.  She clearly violated a proper order of the Chilean court—an order she 
herself sought.”  Id. at 640–41. 
 19. Id. at 641.   
 20. Id. at 639.   
 21. Id.  See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 8–20 (describing the procedures for a 
return remedy only in those cases where a child’s removal is in breach of rights of custo-
dy); infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Hague Convention). 
 22. Abbott, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 638–39.   
 23. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 24. Id. at 1083. 
 25. Id. at 1084 (“Three federal appellate courts have determined that ne exeat orders 
and statutory ne exeat provisions do not create ‘rights of custody’ under the Hague Conven-
tion.  One federal appellate court . . . reached the opposite conclusion.” (citations omit-
ted)). 
 26. Id. at 1084–86 (describing Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000), abrogated by 
Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010), and Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702 (11th Cir. 
2004)).  
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foreign courts on whether ne exeat rights are custody rights.27
The court emphasized that while the ne exeat order gave Mr. Ab-
bott a “veto right over his son’s departure from Chile,” this “veto 
right” did not constitute a right to determine where in Chile A.J. 
should live.
   
28  In fact, reasoned the Fifth Circuit, the Chilean court 
expressly denied Mr. Abbott any custody rights by granting all custody 
rights to Ms. Abbott.29  The court held that “ne exeat rights, even when 
coupled with ‘rights of access,’ do not constitute ‘rights of custody’” 
under the Hague Convention.30  The Fifth Circuit denied Mr. Ab-
bott’s return request on the grounds that he held no custody rights 
and therefore no return right under the Hague Convention.31  The 
Supreme Court of the United States granted Mr. Abbott’s petition for 
certiorari to resolve the circuit court split on whether a ne exeat right 
constitutes a right of custody.32
 
 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Interpretation of treaties has a long history in American juri-
sprudence.33  Court precedent instructs that treaty interpretation be-
gins with its text.34  In the case of international parental abductions, 
the text to be consulted is that of the Hague Convention.  Part II.A, 
therefore, begins with a discussion of relevant family-law terminology, 
the Hague Convention, and recent U.S. case law interpreting whether 
ne exeat rights constitute custody rights.35
 
 27. Id. at 1086 (citing Furnes, 362 F.3d at 719) (noting that the United Kingdom, Aus-
tralia, South Africa, and Israel recognize ne exeat rights as rights of custody while Canada 
and France do not). 
  Part II.B provides a brief 
overview of relevant treaty interpretation philosophies—namely, the 
 28. Id. at 1087.   
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. The Fifth Circuit found the Second Circuit’s reasoning in Croll particularly per-
suasive.  Id.  (emphasizing that the treaty “clearly distinguishes between ‘rights of custody’ 
and ‘rights of access’ and that ordering the return of a child in the absence of ‘rights of 
custody’ in an effort to serve the overarching purposes of the Hague Convention would be 
an impermissible judicial amendment of the Convention”).  
 31. Id. at 1087–88.  The Fifth Circuit noted, as the district court did, that Ms. Abbott 
“unquestionably violated [Mr.] Abbott’s rights by removing their child from Chile without 
his consent,” but could offer no remedy to Mr. Abbott under the Hague Convention as 
Mr. Abbott lacked rights of custody.  Id. 
 32. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (2010). 
 33. See, e.g., Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 201–09 (1796) (interpreting the 1783 
Treaty of Peace between the United States and Great Britain). 
 34. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (“The interpretation of a trea-
ty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its text.”). 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
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canons of good faith and liberal interpretation.36  Part II.B concludes 
by discussing the mechanics of treaty interpretation in U.S. courts37 
and recent treaty decisions by the post-Rehnquist Supreme Court.38
A.  Understanding the Terminology and Context of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction 
   
The Hague Convention governs international parental child-
abduction law and, therefore, whether a violation of a ne exeat right 
constitutes a wrongful removal and grants a corresponding right of 
return under the Convention.39
 
  Before delving into a discussion of 
the Hague Convention, this section begins with an overview of rele-
vant family-law terminology.  This section then describes the Hague 
Convention framework.  The section concludes by discussing the split 
in U.S. circuit courts over whether ne exeat rights constitute custody 
rights under the Hague Convention. 
1. Defining Rights of Custody and Access, as Well as Ne Exeat 
Rights, in International Family Law 
A custody right usually connotes a responsibility for daily supervi-
sion and care of a child.40  In the family-law context, Black’s Law Dic-
tionary defines custody as “care, control, and maintenance of a child 
awarded by a court to a responsible adult.”41  A custody right, howev-
er, may not always mean either sole physical custody of or decision-
making responsibility for a child.42  Parents may share custody rights.  
Additionally, a parent without custody rights may have a role in deci-
sion making or periodic physical custody of the child.43  Such rights 
for the noncustodial parent constitute visitation rights or “rights of 
access.”44  These synonymous rights45 generally provide a non-
custodial parent with access to the child.46
 
 36. See infra Part II.B.1. 
  
 37. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 38. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 39. Hague Convention, supra note 3.  The United States recognizes the Hague Con-
vention as binding domestic law, as stated in the International Child Abduction Remedies 
Act (“ICARA”),  42 U.S.C. § 11601 (2006) [hereinafter ICARA].  
 40. BARBARA STARK, INTERNATIONAL FAMILY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION 182 (2005). 
 41. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 441 (9th ed. 2009). 
 42. STARK, supra note 40, at 182. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Visitation or access rights are not to be confused with joint custody rights.  Cf. id. 
(“Visitation generally refers to briefer periods of time (during summer vacations, for ex-
ample), while joint custody refers to a more equal balance of responsibility.”). 
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The exact meaning of such legal terms, however, can vary de-
pending on the national jurisdiction in question or the applicable le-
gal instrument.  For example, the Hague Convention provides expla-
nations for both custody and access rights.47  Although these 
explanations are not exhaustive definitions of the terms,48 any court 
applying the Hague Convention must turn to them.49  Custody rights, 
the treaty states, “shall include rights relating to the care of the per-
son of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s 
place of residence.”50  Access rights under the Hague Convention 
“shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a 
place other than the child’s habitual residence.”51
A court order or national statute may condition established 
rights of custody or access.  One type of condition is a ne exeat right.  A 
ne exeat right prevents a person from going beyond the jurisdictional 
reach of a court unless certain conditions are met or the court grants 
permission.
 
52  In the context of family law, a ne exeat right prevents a 
parent from removing a child from a court’s jurisdiction.53
 
 45. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 
  A ne exeat 
provision may be contained in either a court order or conveyed as a 
statutory right.  Chile, for example, establishes a ne exeat right through 
41, at 14 (defining access, in the family 
law context, as “visitation”).  See also ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11602(7) (2006) (“[T]he term 
‘rights of access’ means visitation rights.”). 
 46. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1707 (defining visitation as “[a] rel-
ative’s, [especially] a noncustodial parent’s, period of access to a child”). 
 47. See Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5 (defining rights of custody and access). 
 48. ELISA PÉREZ-VERA, EXPLANATORY REPORT ON THE 1980 HAGUE CHILD ABDUCTION 
CONVENTION 451 (1982) [hereinafter PÉREZ-VERA REPORT] (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl28.pdf (“The Convention, following a long-established 
tradition of the Hague Conference, does not define the legal concepts used by it.  Howev-
er, in this article [5], it does make clear the sense in which the notions of custody and 
access rights are used, since an incorrect interpretation of their meaning would risk com-
promising the Convention’s objects.”). 
 49. Cf. Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 145 (2d Cir. 2000) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(“While traditional American notions of custody rights are certainly relevant to our inter-
pretation of the Convention, the construction of an international treaty also requires that 
we look beyond parochial definitions to the broader meaning of the Convention, and as-
sess the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in 
the light of [the Convention’s] object and purpose.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31.1; May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331)), 
abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 50. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(a). 
 51. Id. art. 5(b). 
 52. Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 n.8 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott, 130 
S. Ct. at 1983.   
 53. See Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008) (“‘Ne exeat’ is defined 
in the family law context as ‘[a]n equitable writ restraining a person from leaving, or re-
moving a child or property from, the jurisdiction.’”), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010).   
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a statutory provision.54  This provision requires the non-removing 
parent’s consent prior to a child’s removal from Chile by the other 
parent.55  This consent is required regardless of whether the remov-
ing parent is the custodial parent or a parent with access rights.56
 
   
2.  The Hague Convention  
Parental child abduction57 is governed internationally by the Ha-
gue Convention.  This multilateral agreement seeks to prevent and 
remedy the wrongful taking abroad of children by parents or guar-
dians.  As a private-law treaty, the Hague Convention provides non-
removing parents with enforceable rights to either: (1) in the case of 
access rights, gain recognition of those rights in a foreign court or, 
(2) in the case of custody rights, have a child returned to her country 
of habitual residence.58  The United States recognizes the Hague 
Convention as binding domestic law, as stated in the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”).59  United States courts 
therefore look directly to the treaty’s text when reviewing Hague 
Convention cases.60  U.S. circuit courts, however, differ in their inter-
pretations of ne exeat rights under the Hague Convention.61
 
  
 
 54. See Villegas Duran v. Arribada Beaumont, 534 F.3d 142, 145 n.1 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(providing an excerpt of the Chilean Minors Law describing the statutory ne exeat provi-
sion).  
 55. See Abbott, 542 F.3d at 1083–84 & n.4 (describing the Chilean Minors Law to re-
quire “that if a non-custodial parent has visitation rights, that parent’s authorization is re-
quired before the custodial parent can take the child out of the country”). 
 56. Id. at 1084 n.4. 
 57. PAUL R. BEAUMONT & PETER E. MCELEAVY, THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 1 (1999) (distinguishing this “unilateral removal or 
retention of children” from third-party or “classic kidnappings” by emphasizing that a pa-
rental abductor seeks to “exercise . . . sole care and control . . . in a new jurisdiction” ra-
ther than obtaining “material gain”).  “Child abduction,” sometimes described as legal 
kidnapping, is a term of art in international private law and is distinguishable from third-
party, or non-parental, kidnapping.  Id. at 1, 3. 
 58. See infra notes 66–73 and accompanying text.  
 59. ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11603(a) (2006) (“The courts of the States and the United 
States district courts shall have concurrent original jurisdiction of actions arising under 
the Convention.”); id. § 11601(b)(2) (“The provisions of this chapter are in addition to 
and not in lieu of the provisions of the Convention.”). 
 60. Id. § 11601(b)(4) (“The Convention and this Act empower courts in the United 
States to determine only rights under the Convention and not the merits of any underly-
ing child custody claims.”).  
 61. See infra Part II.A.2.b. 
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a. The Hague Convention Is a Collaborative Framework to 
Resolve the Problem of Child Abduction and a Mechanism to 
Return Wrongfully Removed Children 
The Hague Convention seeks to deter and remedy international 
child abduction and to ensure access in the event of lawful removal.  
Specifically, the Hague Convention’s objectives are to “secure the 
prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or retained in any 
Contracting State; and . . . to ensure that rights of custody and of 
access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected 
in the other Contracting States.”62    The Hague Convention’s private 
rights—that is, the individual right to prompt return and respect for 
established custody and access rights—only apply among the Conven-
tion’s contracting or member states.63
The Hague Convention provides a framework for foreign respect 
and restoration of rights rather than re-adjudication of the merits.
       
64  
This framework envisions “a system of close co-operation among 
[member states’] judicial and administrative authorities.”65
 
 62. Hague Convention, supra note 
  Courts 
3, art. 1.  As described in the Convention’s pream-
ble, respect for these private parental rights is premised on the “interests of children” and 
the need “to protect children internationally from the harmful effects of their wrongful 
removal or retention.”  Id. pmbl.  The Hague Convention’s development coincided with a 
changing familial dynamic worldwide.  BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 57, at 2 (de-
scribing child abduction as a “late twentieth century” issue resulting from increased per-
sonal mobility, international marriages and relationships, and subsequent divorces, as well 
as a general “breakdown in traditional family structure”).     
 63. Currently, there are eighty-seven member states to the Hague Convention.  Status 
Table, Hague Convention, HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L LAW, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited Nov. 15, 
2011).  These members include both the United States and Chile. Id.  The United States 
signed the Convention in 1981, and ratified it in 1988, the same year the Convention en-
tered into force for the United States.  Id.  Chile acceded to the Hague Convention in 
1994, and the treaty became law the same year.  Id.  The United States accepted Chile’s 
accession in 1994 (as required by Article 38 of the Hague Convention).  Id.  In the event 
an abduction occurs to or from a non-member state, public-law treaties may provide re-
course for parents if the involved countries are members to those public-law treaties.  The 
most relevant public-law treaty is the United Nations Convention of the Rights of the 
Child, which imposes a duty on states, as described above, to “take measures to combat the 
illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad.”  U.N. Convention on the Rights of the 
Child art. 11, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989).     
 64. See, e.g., ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(4) (2006) (“The Convention and this chap-
ter empower courts in the United States to determine only rights under the Convention 
and not the merits of any underlying child custody claims.”). 
 65. PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 435.  A survey determined that at least 1,610 
Hague Convention applications were processed in 2003.  HAGUE CONF. ON PRIVATE INT’L 
LAW, A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF APPLICATIONS MADE IN 2003 UNDER THE HAGUE 
CONVENTION OF 25 OCTOBER 1980 ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD 
ABDUCTION 7, 10–11 (2007),  available at http://www.hcch.net/upload/wop/abd_ 
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hearing Hague Convention cases do not redistribute parental rights 
previously established in another member state but instead consider 
whether (1) a child’s removal was wrongful and therefore requires re-
turn of the child to her habitual country of residence, or (2) parental 
rights have been violated through a child’s removal or retention 
abroad.66
A child’s removal is considered wrongful when the removal is in 
violation of custody rights that “were actually exercised, either jointly 
or alone, or would have been . . . but for the removal or retention.”
   
67  
Custody rights are defined as rights “relating to the care of the person 
of the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place 
of residence.”68  Such custody rights may result “by operation of law 
or by reason of a judicial or administrative decision.”69
In contrast, removal by a custodial parent in violation of the non-
removing parent’s access rights does not constitute a wrongful remov-
al under the Hague Convention; the treaty specifically limits wrongful 
removal to a breach of custody rights.
  
70  The Hague Convention de-
fines access rights as including “the right to take a child for a limited 
period of time to a place other than the child’s habitual residence.”71  
The Convention seeks to protect these rights through member-state 
cooperation and recognition of established access rights.72
 
pd03e1_2007.pdf (describing questionnaire responses from fifty-eight member states).  Of 
these 1,610 applications, approximately 1,355 were for return of a child and 255 were for 
access to a child.  Id. at 10–11.  In contrast, at least 1,280 applications were processed in 
1999, with approximately 1,060 return applications and 220 access applications.  Id. at 7, 
10–11 (note that only thirty-nine member states responded in the 1999 survey).  The scope 
of abductions and their resolutions is unknown.  See BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 
  Prompt 
57, at 1–2 (“The true extent of the phenomenon has been, and remains, a point of some 
conjecture.”).  
 66. See PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 429  (“[S]ince one factor characteristic of 
the situations under consideration consists in the fact that the abductor claims that his ac-
tion has been rendered lawful by the competent authorities of the State of refuge, one ef-
fective way of deterring him would be to deprive his actions of any practical or juridical 
consequences.  The Convention, in order to bring this about, places at the head of its ob-
jectives the restoration of the status quo, by means of ‘the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed to or retained in any Contracting State.’” (quoting Hague Conven-
tion, supra note 3,  art. 1(a))). 
 67. Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a), (b).   
 68. Id. art. 5(a). 
 69. Id. art. 3. 
 70. See id. (defining as “wrongful” the removal or retention of a child that occurs “in 
breach of rights of custody” but not in breach of access rights).  
 71. Id. art. 5(b). 
 72. See id. art. 21 (describing procedures for securing “effective exercise” of access 
rights, binding member states to “the obligations of co-operation . . . to promote the 
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return of a child is not required by the treaty, however, when removal 
or retention only violates access rights.73
Custody and access rights are the only terms given some explana-
tion in the Hague Convention.  The explanatory report for the Hague 
Convention, known as the Pérez-Vera Report, describes such an ap-
proach as consistent with treaties developed by the Hague Confe-
rence on Private International Law.
   
74  This same report suggests that 
the definitions for custody and access rights are not exhaustive.75
 
  Ne 
exeat rights, however, are not mentioned in the Hague Convention.    
b.  United States Circuit Courts Differ on Whether Ne Exeat 
Rights Constitute Custody Rights Under the Hague 
Convention 
Over the last decade, five U.S. circuit courts examined, without 
achieving unanimity, whether ne exeat rights constitute custody rights 
under the Hague Convention.  Four of the circuit courts concluded 
that ne exeat rights do not constitute custody rights,76 while the fifth 
court determined that ne exeat rights are custody rights under the Ha-
gue Convention.77
 
  The Second Circuit’s Croll v. Croll decision is the 
leading decision for courts holding that ne exeat rights are not custody 
rights, while the Eleventh Circuit’s Furnes v. Reeves decision represents 
the alternative view that ne exeat rights are custody rights.   
 
peaceful enjoyment of access rights,” and requiring member states to remove “obstacles to 
the exercise” of access rights). 
 73. See id. art. 3 (limiting wrongful removal, which requires prompt return of child, to 
a breach of custody rights). 
 74. PÉREZ-VERA REPORT, supra note 48, at 451 (“The Convention . . . does not define 
the legal concepts used by it.  However, in this article [5], it does make clear the sense in 
which the notions of custody and access rights are used, since an incorrect interpretation 
of their meaning would risk compromising the Convention’s objects.”).   
 75. Id. at 452 (stating that “[t]he Convention seeks to be more precise by emphasiz-
ing,” in the definition of custody rights, that the right to determine a child’s place of resi-
dence is “an example of . . . ‘care’” while the definition for access rights does not exclude 
other methods of exercising access rights). 
 76. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1082 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that ne exeat rights 
are not rights of custody), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 
491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); 
Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 949 (9th Cir. 2002) (same), abrogated by Abbott, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1983; Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 139–40 (2d Cir. 2000) (same), abrogated by Abbott, 
130 S. Ct. at 1983.   
 77. Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 714 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a ne exeat right 
provides a custody right). 
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1.    Croll v. Croll: Ne Exeat Rights Are Not Rights of 
Custody Under the Hague Convention 
Croll began with the separation and divorce of two U.S. citizens 
living in Hong Kong.78  A Hong Kong court issued a custody order 
that included a ne exeat clause.79  Ms. Croll violated this clause when 
she took her daughter from Hong Kong to New York without Mr. 
Croll’s consent.80  The Second Circuit held that the ne exeat clause did 
not grant Mr. Croll the custody right necessary under the Hague 
Convention to require his daughter’s prompt return to Hong Kong.81
The Croll court based this holding primarily on the treaty’s text 
and the drafters’ intent.  The court observed that “[n]othing in the 
Hague Convention suggests that the drafters intended anything other 
than [an] ordinary understanding of custody,” which in turn sug-
gested to the circuit court that the ordinary United States’ under-
standing of traditional custody rights would apply.
   
82  The court em-
phasized that the travel restriction imposed by the ne exeat order was 
insufficient to constitute a custody right in the non-custodial parent, 
since a Hong Kong court awarded “custody care and control solely to 
the mother.”83  The Second Circuit examined the Hague Conven-
tion’s ratification history and found that the drafters’ intent was con-
sistent with the court’s own determination that ne exeat rights are not 
custody rights.84  The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits looked to Croll 
for guidance and were persuaded similarly that a “single veto power” 
coupled with access rights was insufficient to constitute a custody 
right under the Hague Convention.85
 
 78. Croll, 229 F.3d at 135. 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 138-39 (relying on U.S. court cases and “American lexical sources”). 
 83. Id. at 139–40 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Then-Circuit 
Judge Sotomayor dissented from this decision, noting in particular, “[i]nterpreting the 
text of the Convention in light of its object and purpose, and taking into account the rele-
vant case law in this area, I reach the opposite conclusion.  In my view, the majority se-
riously misconceives the legal import of the ne exeat clause and, in so doing, undermines 
the Convention’s goal of ‘ensur[ing] that rights of custody . . . under the law of one Con-
tracting State are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.’” Id. at 144 (Soto-
mayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 4). 
 84. Id. at 141–42 (majority opinion) (examining materials from the drafting chair, the 
official history, and the Department of State’s transmittal of the treaty to the U.S. Presi-
dent). 
 85. Abbott v. Abbott, 542 F.3d 1081, 1087 (5th Cir. 2008), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010); 
Fawcett v. McRoberts, 326 F.3d 491, 500 (4th Cir. 2003), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 
S. Ct. 1983 (2010); Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2002), abrogated by Abbott, 
130 S. Ct. at 1983.   
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2.  Furnes v. Reeves: Ne Exeat Rights Are Custody Rights 
Under the Hague Convention 
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the reasoning of the other 
circuit courts and instead determined that ne exeat rights do constitute 
custody rights under the Hague Convention.86  In Furnes v. Reeves, the 
Eleventh Circuit decided that the characterization of a ne exeat right as 
“a mere veto right” was not fatal to finding a ne exeat right to be a cus-
tody right under the Hague Convention.87  Under a settlement 
agreement, the parents in Furnes shared a “joint parental responsibili-
ty,” where the American mother had physical custody of and the 
Norwegian father had regular access to their daughter during vaca-
tions and holidays.88  Additionally, under Norwegian law, joint paren-
tal responsibility includes the right to make decisions regarding some 
aspects of a child’s care and specifically requires the consent of both 
parents for a child to move abroad.89  The Eleventh Circuit inter-
preted the latter right as constituting a ne exeat right for the Norwe-
gian father, which the mother violated when she removed the daugh-
ter to the United States without the father’s permission.90
After assessing the facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit deter-
mined that the ne exeat right constituted a custody right under the 
Hague Convention.  To the circuit court, the father’s ability to deter-
mine whether his daughter lived outside of or within Norway was suf-
ficient to qualify as a custody right under the Hague Convention.
   
91  
The Eleventh Circuit disagreed with Croll’s reasoning because, consis-
tent with the Hague Convention’s definition of custody rights, a ne ex-
eat right is not a mere limitation or veto right against foreign travel 
but rather a parental right to determine a child’s place of residence 
within or outside the relevant country.92
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit also rejected Croll’s reasoning that ne 
exeat rights contravene the purpose of the Hague Convention because 
 
 
 86. See Furnes v. Reeves, 362 F.3d 702, 716, 719 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that a ne ex-
eat right provides a custody right and rejecting the Croll decision). 
 87. Id. at 716 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 88. Id. at 706–07. 
 89. Id. at 707–08. 
 90. Id. at 714. 
 91. Id. (explaining that “violation of a single custody right suffices to make removal of a 
child wrongful,” and as long as the parent possesses at least one custody right, “a parent 
need not have ‘custody’ of the child to be entitled to return of his child under the Con-
vention”). 
 92. Id. at 719–20. 
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they may result in return of a child to a non-custodial parent.93  The 
purpose of the Hague Convention, the Eleventh Circuit observed, “is 
to prevent the international abduction of children” and ne exeat rights 
as custody rights are consistent with that purpose.94  In contrast to 
previous circuit court decisions, the Eleventh Circuit ultimately held 
that the parental right to weigh in on a decision relating to a child’s 
place of residence, even if in the form of a ne exeat right, was suffi-
ciently related to the child’s care to qualify as a custody right under 
the Hague Convention.95
 
 
B.  Treaty Interpretation in the United States 
Treaty interpretation in the United States involves constitutional 
considerations, philosophical differences, and use of basic interpreta-
tion tools.  The Constitution grants treaties the force of federal law96 
and establishes the judicial branch as the primary authority to interp-
ret treaties.97  Once a treaty becomes U.S. law,98 any private rights 
conveyed by that treaty may be enforced through litigation.99  Al-
though the creation of a treaty and its entry into U.S. law is under the 
authority of the political branches, courts interpret treaty language 
and apply these interpretations to the relevant case or controversy.100
 
 93. Id. at 720–21. 
   
 94. Id. at 721. 
 95. Id. at 716.   
 96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, 
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .”); see 
also Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“Our constitution declares a treaty 
to be the law of the land.”). 
 97. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law 
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties 
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); see also Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. 
(3 Dall.) 199, 239 (1796) (“[T]he courts, in which the cases arose, were the only proper 
authority to decide, whether the case was within this article of the treaty, and the opera-
tion and effect of it.”).  
 98. Treaties can be either self-executing or non-self-executing, which affects how they 
become U.S. law.  A self-executing treaty automatically has the force of law when the treaty 
enters into force, which means that the treaty itself becomes U.S. law.  See Medellin v. Tex-
as, 552 U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008) (recognizing self-executing treaties as binding federal 
law).  A non-self-executing treaty requires that Congress pass a statute to implement the 
terms of the treaty, which means that the statute is U.S. law rather than the treaty itself.  See 
id. at 505–06 (recognizing that non-self-executing treaties cannot “create[] binding federal 
law in the absence of implementing legislation”).   
 99. Maiorano v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268, 272–73 (1909) (“A treaty . . . is the 
supreme law of the land, binding alike National and state courts, and is capable of en-
forcement, and must be enforced by them in the litigation of private rights.”). 
 100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
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Despite designating the judicial branch as the final authority on 
treaty interpretation, the Constitution provides no set approach to 
that interpretation.101  Various philosophies of interpretation have 
guided U.S. treaty jurisprudence throughout the country’s history.102  
However, certain guiding principles of interpretation—that is, certain 
basic mechanics or tools—remain consistent.103
 
  This section begins 
by describing, in Part II.B.1, the canons of good faith and liberal in-
terpretation, which were the dominant treaty interpretation philoso-
phy until the mid-twentieth century.  Part II.B.2 discusses the mechan-
ics of treaty interpretation.  Part II.B.3 gives an overview of the post-
Rehnquist Court’s first three treaty-interpretation cases.   
1.  A Purposive Approach to Treaties: The Canons of Good Faith and 
Liberal Interpretation 
There is no single philosophy guiding U.S. treaty interpretation: 
U.S. Supreme Court cases instead reference a number of different 
philosophies.104  One of these philosophies is the philosophy of good 
faith and liberal interpretation, which influenced treaty interpreta-
tion throughout the nineteenth century and dominated treaty juri-
sprudence in the first half of the twentieth century105
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation provide a 
“prudential norm” to guard against judicial treaty breaches.
  before seeming-
ly dying out in the latter half of the twentieth century.   
106
 
 101. See David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 
953, 957 (1994) [hereinafter Bederman, Revivalist Canons] (emphasizing that “no rules of 
treaty interpretation . . . are mandated by the Constitution itself, or are legitimately de-
rived directly from constitutional allocations of authority”). 
  Under 
 102. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 103. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 104. Alex Glashausser, What We Must Never Forget When It Is a Treaty We Are Expounding, 
73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (2005) (“[T]he Supreme Court lacks a coherent doctrine for 
interpreting treaties.”).  Examples of treaty interpretation approaches include emphasiz-
ing executive deference.  See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 718–19 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“But where, as here, an ambiguous treaty provision . . . is suscept-
ible of two plausible, and reasonable, interpretations, our precedents require us to defer 
to the Executive’s interpretation.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 294 (1933) (noting that liberal con-
struction of treaty obligations and good-faith considerations are principles “consistently 
recognized and applied by this Court”); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 540 
(1884) (“Treaties of every kind . . . are to receive a fair and liberal interpretation, accord-
ing to the intention of the contracting parties, and are to be kept in the most scrupulous 
good faith.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 106. Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for 
Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1932 (2005) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith] 
(“If a court construes the domestic-law incidents of a treaty in a manner consistent with its 
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the liberal-interpretation canon, courts favor an interpretation of a 
treaty that is more, rather than less, protective of the rights laid out by 
the treaty.107  Similarly, the good-faith doctrine recognizes that the 
unique nature of treaties requires courts to consider obligations to 
treaty partners and to interpret internationally-agreed-upon text as 
distinct from domestic legal understandings.108  Liberal interpreta-
tions undertaken in good faith were intended to limit judicial breach-
es of international obligations.109
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation focus on 
three key elements.  First, these canons emphasize that interpretation 
should consider the “objects and purposes” of the treaty’s member 
states.
   
110  Second, good faith and liberal interpretation recognize that 
reciprocity and equal obligation exist among member states.111  
Third, these interpretative canons reject strict adherence to the text 
at the expense of breaches in international obligations.112
 
international law obligations, no violation occurs.  But . . . if the interpretation misfires, it 
is the court’s action (not the international conduct of the executive branch) that breaches 
the treaty.”). 
  By recog-
 107. See Shanks v. Dupont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 249 (1830) (“If the treaty admits of two 
interpretations, and one is limited, and the other is liberal; one which will further, and the 
other exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal exposition be adopted?”).  
Fifty years after Shanks, Hauenstein v. Lynham described Shanks as the “settled rule” when it 
virtually reiterated this Shanks language on liberal interpretation.  100 U.S. 483, 487 
(1879).   
 108. See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 68 (1821) (“[The arguments] 
embrace the interpretation of a treaty which we are bound to observe with the most scru-
pulous good faith, and which our Government could not violate without disgrace, and 
which this Court could not disregard without betraying its duty.  It need not be said, there-
fore, that we feel the responsibility of our stations on this occasion . . . .”).  See also Van Als-
tine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1888 (observing that this doctrine “served to 
remind courts of the special international law origins of treaties, of their fundamental dif-
ference with purely domestic legal norms, and of the need to show sensitivity for the views 
of our nation’s treaty partners”).   
 109. See Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 437 (1902) (“As treaties are solemn en-
gagements entered into between independent nations for the common advancement of 
their interests and the interests of civilization, . . . they should be interpreted in that broad 
and liberal spirit which is calculated to make for the existence of a perpetual amity . . . .”).  
 110. Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912) (recognizing that treaties “are to 
be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were en-
tered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states). 
 111. See, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 293 (1933) (“Considerations which 
should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as 
well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the appar-
ent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between.”).   
 112. See United States v. Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 220 (1902) (“[T]he court ought to hesi-
tate to adopt any construction of the treaty that would tend to defeat the object each 
[member] had in view.”).  See also Michael P. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, 
1901–1945, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 191, 213 (David L. Sloss 
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nizing that treaties “are to be read in the light of the conditions and 
circumstances existing at the time they were entered into, with a view 
to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states,113 the 
Court embraced an interpretive philosophy that included considera-
tion of international obligations and purpose, as well as treaty text 
and drafter intent.114
Reference to treaty objects and purposes often signaled the 
Court’s use of good faith and liberal interpretation.  For example, in 
United States v. Yen Tai, the Court cautioned against “adopt[ing] any 
construction of the treaty that would tend to defeat the object each 
[member state] had in view.”
   
115  Similarly, Sullivan v. Kidd recognized 
that treaties “are to be executed in the utmost good faith, with a view 
to making effective the purposes of the high contracting parties.”116  
By 1931, the Court called liberal interpretation “the familiar rule” 
that “is not necessary to invoke” when emphasizing that “regard 
should be had to the purpose of [a t]reaty.”117  This purposive ap-
proach was termed an “accepted canon” by the Court in the 1940 de-
cision Bacardi Corp. of America v. Domenech.118
Subsequent international law integrated aspects of good faith 
and a purposive approach to treaty interpretation.  Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that “[a] treaty shall 
be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose.”
 
119  The Vienna Convention, while not rati-
fied by the United States,120
 
et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court] (observing that the 
“practical consequence of . . . liberal interpretation . . . was a profoundly flexible approach 
that was open to the broader purposes of a treaty and was not mindlessly bound to its 
text”). 
 “represents generally accepted prin-
ciples . . . the United States has also appeared willing to accept . . . de-
 113. Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32. 
 114. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, supra note 112, at 213. 
 115. Yen Tai, 185 U.S. at 220. 
 116. 254 U.S. 433, 439 (1921). 
 117. See Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30, 37, 40 (1931) (noting the proper construc-
tion of the treaty language). 
 118. 311 U.S. 150, 163 (1940).  
 119. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 120. The Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General, Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, AUDIOVISUAL LIBRARY OF INT’L LAW, 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/vclt/vclt.html.      
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spite differences of nuance and emphasis.”121  At least one American 
scholar has suggested that citations to Article 31 by U.S. courts sug-
gest an implicit endorsement of the good-faith canon.122
In the United States, however, the purposive approach fostered 
by good faith and liberal interpretation vanished in the latter half of 
the twentieth century.  In the last seventy years, the Supreme Court 
used the signal phrase “objects and purposes” only six times.  None of 
these references, however, signaled use of a purposive approach or a 
return to good faith and liberal interpretation; more often, the refer-
ences were simply quotes of an earlier case.
 
123  By the twenty-first cen-
tury, U.S. scholars lamented the “death of good faith” and liberal in-
terpretation.124
 
 
2.  Mechanics of Treaty Interpretation 
Regardless of the philosophic approach applied, interpretation 
 
 121. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 
cmt. a (1987) (discussing Articles 31(1) and (3) of the Vienna Convention on Treaties, 
which are restated in § 325); see also Maria Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties Before United States Courts, 28 VA. J. INT’L L. 281, 294, 299 (1988) (stating that the 
text of the Vienna Convention was adopted by the United States).  But see Paul R. Du-
binsky, International Law in the Legal System of the United States, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 455, 470 
n.58 (2010) (“American courts rarely make reference to the Vienna Convention’s rules on 
treaty interpretation.”). 
 122. David Sloss, United States, in THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN TREATY 
ENFORCEMENT 504, 518–19, 524 (David Sloss ed., 2009) (identifying nineteen cases refe-
rencing Article 31 out of 254 treaty-related cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court be-
tween 1970 and 2006, and categorizing these cases as using good faith). 
 123. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (“An international agree-
ment is to be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be giv-
en to its terms in the context and in the light of its object and purpose.” (quoting 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) 
(1986)); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993) (discussing the lower 
court’s reading, as supported by the “object and purpose” of the treaty, and referencing 
the drafters’ intent, as represented by the negotiating history), superseded by statute, Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-626 (1996); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 332 (1912)); Volkswa-
genwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 
U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Max-
imov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that the 
treaty’s “purposes and objectives” require a certain interpretation). 
 124. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1885, 1887 (observing that 
“good faith has died” and that liberal interpretation “has suffered a similar, if less stark, 
fate”). 
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begins with a treaty’s text and its context.125  The text represents the 
“shared expectations” of the treaty’s member states126 and therefore is 
a reasonable basis for interpretation.127  In reading the text, courts of-
ten apply tools from contract law128 and general rules of construc-
tion.129  Courts also may look beyond the text and consider extratex-
tual sources, such as the negotiation and drafting history, the 
postratification conduct of treaty member states,130 the postratifica-
tion interpretations by the courts of other member states,131 and simi-
lar classes and types of treaties.132
Reference to extratextual sources recognizes the unique nature 
of treaties and is well-established in Supreme Court treaty jurispru-
dence.
   
133
 
 125. See Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 699 (stating that treaty interpretation begins with the trea-
ty’s text and “the context in which the written words are used” (quoting Société Indu-
strielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
  The use of extratextual sources ensures a better under-
standing of U.S. legal obligations to other treaty member states and 
 126.  Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 650 (2004) (quoting Air France v. Saks, 
470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 127. Cf. In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 72 (1821) (“[T]this Court is 
bound to give effect to the stipulations of the treaty in the manner and to the extent which 
the parties have declared, and not otherwise.”). 
 128. See, e.g., Société Industrielle Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 533 (“In interpreting an interna-
tional treaty, we are mindful that it is in the nature of a contract between nations, to which 
general rules of construction apply.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
But see E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 535 (1991) (rejecting exact similarity be-
tween treaty and contract law by recognizing that “treaties are construed more liberally 
than private agreements” (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. at 396) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)).   
 129. See, e.g., Schlunk, 486 U.S. at 700 (stating that “general rules of construction may be 
brought to bear on difficult or ambiguous passages” in treaty interpretation).   
 130. Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996) (“Because a treaty 
ratified by the United States is not only the law of this land, but also an agreement among 
sovereign powers, we have traditionally considered as aids to its interpretation the nego-
tiating and drafting history (travaux préparatoires) and the postratification understanding of 
the contracting parties.” (citation omitted)). 
 131. Husain, 540 U.S. at 658 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“When we interpret a treaty, we ac-
cord the judgments of our sister signatories ‘considerable weight.’” (quoting Saks, 470 U.S. 
at 404)). 
 132. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 633 (2006) (using Article 75 of Proto-
col I to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to define a phrase used in Article 3 of the Geneva 
Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War). 
 133. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431–32 (1943) 
(“[T]reaties are construed more liberally than private agreements, and to ascertain their 
meaning we may look beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotia-
tions, and the practical construction adopted by the parties.”).    
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prevents judicial breaches of treaty obligations.134  Numerous ratio-
nales support the use of extratextual sources and explain why such 
sources inform the U.S. legal obligation.  For example, courts rely on 
a treaty’s drafting history to better understand member-state intent at 
the time the treaty was written.135  Similarly, courts give “great weight” 
to the executive branch’s interpretations of treaty provisions.136  For-
eign judicial decisions also help U.S. courts to understand how a trea-
ty is subsequently interpreted by member states.137  While not disposi-
tive, these foreign decisions may provide guidance on how other 
member states interpret the treaty, which in turn gives further context 
for how the treaty should be interpreted by a U.S. court.138
Despite the importance of extratextual sources to treaty interpre-
tation, the last thirty years have seen a debate in the Supreme Court 
about whether reference to extratextual sources is triggered only by 
ambiguous text.
  
139  The reasoning advanced in cases such as Chan v. 
Korean Air Lines, Ltd.140 resembled both a textualist approach to statu-
tory interpretation and the approach put forth by the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties.141
 
 134. Cf. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (2008) (“Because a treaty ratified by the 
United States is ‘an agreement among sovereign powers,’ we have also considered as ‘aids 
to its interpretation’ the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well as ‘the post-
ratification understanding’ of signatory nations.”). 
  Specifically, Chan stated that inter-
 135. Saks, 470 U.S. at 400 (“In interpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the 
records of its drafting and negotiation.”). 
 136. Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).  The executive branch perspective 
provides insight both into the member states’ intent at the time of drafting and, through 
the executive branch’s postratification conduct, into the member states’ subsequent inter-
pretation of the treaty.  Cf. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1943–44 (re-
cognizing that respect for executive branch interpretations “is properly directed not at the 
formal content of the law, but rather at the international implications of particular inter-
pretive outcomes”). 
 137. Cf. Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644, 658 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (re-
cognizing that the Court “accord[s] the judgments of our sister signatories considerable 
weight” and such respect is relevant as the foreign courts “adopted [the treaty] jointly” 
with the United States (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Compare Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982) (recog-
nizing that “[t]he clear import of treaty language controls” the interpretation), with Chan 
v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing for 
consideration of the executive branch’s view, which “deserves at least to be stated in full, 
and to be considered without the self-affixed blindfold that prevents the Court from ex-
amining anything beyond the treaty language itself”). 
 140.  490 U.S. 122 (1989).  
 141. Id. at 134.  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that extratextual 
sources are to be used only when the text is ambiguous or results in an unreasonable in-
terpretation.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 32 (recogniz-
ing reference to “supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work 
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pretation begins and ends with the treaty’s text, unless that text is 
ambiguous.142
Justice Scalia elaborated on the reasoning for such an approach 
in his concurrence to United States v. Stuart.
   
143  He emphasized that a 
treaty’s members “carefully framed and solemnly ratified expression 
of [their] intentions and expectations” in the treaty’s text.144  Thus, in 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, unambiguous treaty text expresses the par-
ties’ intentions, and ambiguous text is the only “appropriate” reason 
“to give authoritative effect to extratextual materials.”145
Similarly, Justice Blackmun indicated in his dissenting opinion in 
Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc. that reference to a particular extra-
textual source—specifically a treaty’s negotiating history—“is a disfa-
vored alternative of last resort, appropriate only where the terms of 
the document are obscure or lead to ‘manifestly absurd or unreason-
able’ results.”
   
146
Yet the same cases, as well as other contemporaneous cases, offer 
a divergent perspective.  The Stuart majority, in fact, noted that extra-
textual sources “often assist us in giving effect to the intent of the 
Treaty parties.”
     
147  Two months later in his Chan concurrence, Justice 
Brennan cautioned against blind allegiance to the treaty’s text 
alone.148
 
of the treaty” only when a textual reading leaves the meaning “ambiguous or obscure” or 
“leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable”).  But see id. art. 31 (“A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to 
the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”). 
  The Court also recognized the importance of extratextual 
sources in Air France v. Saks, in which the Court noted that “[i]n in-
 142. Chan, 490 U.S. at 134–35.  
 143. 489 U.S. 353, 371 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 373.  
 146. 509 U.S. 155, 194–95 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 32), superseded by statute, Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-
546, 3009-626 (1996).  Similarly, United States v. Alvarez-Machain rejected consideration of 
extratextual sources when the relevant treaty was silent on whether certain extradition 
provisions applied.  504 U.S. 655, 664–66 (1992) (observing that, although pertinent lan-
guage was drafted by legal scholars for possible use in the relevant treaty, there is no text 
specifically addressing the respondent’s argument). 
 147. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 366 (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 185 
(1982) (highlighting extratextual sources, “such as a treaty’s ratification history and its 
subsequent operation”). 
 148. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring). 
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terpreting a treaty it is proper, of course, to refer to the records of its 
drafting and negotiation.”149
Other contemporaneous cases, such as Volkswagenwerk Aktienge-
sellschaft v. Schlunk,
  
150 did little to clarify whether textual ambiguity is 
necessary for reference to extratextual sources.  Volkswagenwerk stated 
that treaty interpretation begins with the treaty’s text and “the context 
in which the written words are used,” but left unsaid what constitutes 
“context.”151  Adding confusion, the Court went on to say that 
“[o]ther general rules of construction may be brought to bear on dif-
ficult or ambiguous passages” and subsequently referenced the rele-
vant treaty’s drafting history.152
Recent cases are similarly ambivalent about whether ambiguity is 
a trigger for use of extratextual sources in treaty interpretation.  In 
Medellin v. Texas, the Court noted that treaty interpretation begins 
with the treaty’s text.
   
153  The Court then stated that, because of a trea-
ty’s unique nature, it considers extratextual sources to aid its interpre-
tation.154  Yet no mention was made of textual ambiguity as a trigger 
for referencing these extratextual sources.  When subsequently dis-
cussing the relevant treaty, however, the Court acknowledged that the 
treaty’s text was silent on the question before it.155
 
 149. 470 U.S. 392, 400 (1985). 
  This acknowled-
gement could suggest the Court’s tacit acceptance of ambiguous text.  
The Court’s failure to clearly state the need for ambiguity as a trigger 
for reference to extratextual sources, however, left open the debate 
over ambiguity. 
 150. 486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
 151. Id. at 699 (quoting Société Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for the S. 
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 534 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 152. Id. at 700.  This broad description is echoed by the Court in Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. 
Floyd and with the same failure to clarify if such context may be provided by extratextual 
sources.  499 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1991).  The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
describes “context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty” as including treaty 
preambles and annexes, as well as “agreement[s] relating to the treaty . . . made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty.”  Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, supra note 119, art. 31.   
 153. 552 U.S. 491, 506 (2008) (citing Saks, 470 U.S. at 396–97). 
 154. Id. at 507 (“Because a treaty ratified by the United States is an agreement among 
sovereign powers, we have also considered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and 
drafting history of the treaty as well as the postratification understanding of signatory na-
tions.” (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).    
 155. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507–08.  The treaty the Court discussed was the Optional Pro-
tocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 500 U.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter Optional 
Protocol]. 
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3.  Treaty Interpretation in the Post-Rehnquist Court  
The post-Rehnquist Supreme Court is in a period of transition 
following the stable years of the Rehnquist Court.156  At the same 
time, the number of treaty cases in the lower courts is increasing.157  
In the initial post-Rehnquist years, the Court undertook three cases 
that provide insight into the Court’s view of treaty interpretation.  
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,158 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,159 and Medellin v. Tex-
as,160 though not exclusively treaty-interpretation cases, involved as-
pects of treaty interpretation relating to private-law treaties161
 
 and 
U.S. sovereign obligations to private parties.  As a result, these cases 
exited the realm of “purely” private-law treaty cases—meaning treaties 
enforcing rights among private parties—to enter the realm of treaty 
cases implicating sovereign obligations to private parties.   
a. Sanchez-Llamas: Deference to the Executive in Treaty-
Enforcement Cases  
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon162 marked the post-Rehnquist Court’s 
first foray into treaty law.  The case involved U.S. authorities’ failure 
to allow foreign nationals to notify their consulates upon detention.163  
Such a failure, the foreign national petitioners argued, violated “indi-
vidually enforceable right[s]”164 granted by Article 36 of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations165
 
 156. JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 4 
(2007) (observing that the final eleven years of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s tenure 
represented the longest period in U.S. history without changes to the Supreme Court 
bench). 
 and warranted suppression of 
 157. See Scott M. Sullivan, Rethinking Treaty Interpretation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 777, 781 (2008) 
(recognizing the “dramatic proliferation of international treaties”). 
 158. 548 U.S. 331 (2006). 
 159. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 160. 552 U.S. at 491. 
 161. Private law is “[t]he body of law dealing with private persons and their property 
and relationships.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 41, at 1316.  In contrast, public 
law is “[t]he body of law dealing with the relations between private individuals and the 
government, and with the structure and operation of the government itself.”  Id. at 1351. 
 162. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 331.  
 163. Id. at 331–32. 
 164. Id. at 342. 
 165. Art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.  Article 36 provides that for 
a foreign national detained by authorities, “if he so requests, the competent authorities of 
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, 
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to 
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”  Id.  Additionally, Article 36 
states that officials are to inform the detained foreign national of these rights.  Id.   
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any statements made while in detention.166  Additionally, the petition-
ers argued that the United States is bound by decisions made by the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).167
The Court, despite suggesting that the case was not a treaty in-
terpretation case,
   
168 nevertheless indulged in some interpretation of 
Article 36 and its application in the United States.  For example, the 
Court began by looking to the treaty’s text and noting that the treaty 
leaves Article 36 implementation to each member state’s domestic 
law.169  The Court also pointed to the postratification conduct of 
Vienna Convention member states, and found persuasive the lack of 
acceptance for the exclusionary rule exhibited by the 139 other 
member states.170  Similarly persuasive for the Court was the fact that 
no other country allowed for judicial remedies of Article 36 violations 
through domestic courts.171  Ultimately, however, because the Court 
saw the case as an issue of treaty enforcement rather than interpreta-
tion, it held that whether the United States is bound by ICJ decisions 
and interpretations is an issue for the executive branch.172
Thus, Sanchez-Llamas suggested the doctrine of executive defe-
rence lives on, at least for private-law treaties implicating sovereign 
obligations.  Sanchez-Llamas focused on this doctrine to the exclusion 
of a purposive approach—there was no concern expressed for the ef-
fect of the interpretation on international obligations or any attempt 
to construe provisions for more liberal protection of individual rights. 
 
 
b.   Hamdan: Preferencing Drafter Intent, as Demonstrated in 
Extratextual Sources, Over Executive Deference 
 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld173
 
 166. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 340.   
 encompassed a broad range of legal issues 
involving the use of military commissions and the laws of war.  Ham-
dan was a Yemeni national who was designated an al Qaeda operative 
 167. Id. at 333–34. 
 168. Id. at 360.  The Court, in fact, stated at the beginning of the opinion that it was 
unnecessary to resolve whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals an enforceable 
right, although the Court gave some consideration to this issue later in the opinion.  Id. at 
343–44, 347. 
 169. Id. at 343. 
 170. Id. at 343–44. 
 171. Id. at 347. 
 172. Id.  Justice Breyer, in his dissent, joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, argued that 
the Court failed to “rise to the interpretive challenge,” which resulted in a de facto inter-
pretation at odds with the Vienna Convention.  Id. at 365, 398, 386 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
Justice Breyer instead argued for an examination of the treaty’s text and intent.  Id. at 379.   
 173. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).   
MaddenFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  11:48 AM 
598 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:575 
by U.S. officials and brought before a U.S. military commission.174  
The specific issues of treaty interpretation focused on how to interp-
ret three clauses in Article 3 of the Third Geneva Convention.175
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority on the first two of the 
three clauses under consideration, used a different approach for the 
interpretation of each of the clauses.  First, in rejecting the govern-
ment’s argument that “conflict not of an international nature” did 
not apply to an al Qaeda operative,
 
176  the Court looked to the treaty’s 
official commentary and the treaty’s previous drafts.177  The Court de-
termined that the treaty applied to U.S. efforts against al Queda oper-
atives on the basis of the commentary’s admonition that the Article 3 
scope was to be “as wide as possible.”178
Second, the Court interpreted the clause “regularly constituted 
court” and determined that Hamdan’s commission deviated from that 
standard.
    
179  Since neither the text nor the commentary to the Third 
Geneva Convention defined a “regularly constituted court,” in reach-
ing that conclusion the Court looked to a similar provision contained 
in a related treaty, the Fourth Geneva Convention, and further de-
scribed in the official commentary of that related treaty.180
Third, Justice Stevens addressed the clause on “judicial guaran-
tees,” but his interpretive approach to this clause did not gain the ma-
       
 
 174. Id. at 566–68. 
 175. See id. at 630 (referencing Geneva Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, [1955] 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter 
Third Geneva Convention]).  The Convention’s three clauses under consideration were 
“armed conflict not of an international character,” “a regularly constituted court,” and “all 
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.”  Id.  
Treaty interpretation was one issue among many others, including discussion of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice and separation of power concerns amidst questions of na-
tional security.  See, e.g., id. at 590 (discussing the history of the military commission in the 
United States). 
 176. Id. at 630. The government argued that efforts against al Qaeda were “internation-
al in scope” and therefore did not constitute a “conflict not of an international character” 
that falls under Third Geneva Convention Article 3.  Id.  Additionally, the government ar-
gued that efforts against al Qaeda did not involve “High Contracting Parties,” as required 
to be considered under the Convention’s Article 2.  Id. at 628–30. 
 177. Id. at 630–31. 
 178. Id.  Also persuasive for the Court was the fact that previous drafts of the treaty con-
tained language limiting the scope of application of this article, and that such language 
was subsequently removed.  Id. 
 179. Id. at 632. 
 180. Id.  The official commentary to the Fourth Geneva Convention recognized “regu-
larly constituted courts” as including ordinary military courts and excluding special tri-
bunals.  Id.  The Court found further support in a related Red Cross treatise, which de-
scribed such courts as established consistent with a country’s existing laws and procedures.  
Id.    
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jority of the Court.181  Justice Stevens first noted that, similar to the 
other two clauses, “[j]udicial guarantees” is not defined in the treaty’s 
text.182  Contrary to his approach with the other two clauses, however, 
Justice Stevens did not look to any extratextual aids in interpretation.  
Instead, he stated that the text must be read as incorporating the 
“barest . . . trial protections” international law recognizes.183
Hamdan demonstrated a variety of interpretive approaches, pri-
marily grounded in the text and reference to extratextual sources.  
Yet even the philosophy of executive deference was discussed in a dis-
senting opinion.
   
184
c.   Medellin: Consideration of Treaty Text, Drafting History, 
and Postratification Conduct of Signatories  
  However, no reference was made to any type of 
purposive approach or reliance on good faith and liberal interpreta-
tion. 
Medellin v. Texas, like the cases preceding it, is not a “pure” treaty 
interpretation case.  Medellin, like Sanchez-Llamas, involved the failure 
of U.S. authorities to notify a foreign national detainee of his ability 
to contact his consulate upon arrest.185  Medellin was one of fifty-one 
Mexican nationals named in an ICJ decision,186 which held that these 
nationals “were entitled to review and reconsideration of their [U.S.] 
state-court convictions and sentences” because the failure to notify 
their consulate was a violation of their rights under the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations.187
To determine that the ICJ decision was not directly enforcea-
ble—that is, self-executing
   
188
 
 181. Id. at 566.  Justice Kennedy did not join this portion of the opinion.  Id. 
—as domestic law in U.S. state courts, the 
 182. Id. at 633 (plurality opinion). 
 183. Id.   
 184. Justice Thomas, in his dissent, which was joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part 
by Justice Alito, addressed the Court’s treaty interpretation on two primary points.  First, 
Justice Thomas found Hamdan’s claims under Article 3 of the Geneva Convention to be 
without merit because deference is owed to the executive branch’s interpretation of 
“armed conflict not of an international character.”  Id. at 718–19 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Second and similarly, Justice Thomas rejected as without merit Hamdan’s claims that the 
Geneva Convention even applies to al Qaeda.   Id. at 724–25.  According to the President, 
whose authority as the Commander in Chief “this Court is bound to respect,” this group is 
not a “High Contracting Party” to the treaty.  Id.   
 185. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 497–98 (2008). 
 186. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (Mar. 31). 
 187. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 497–99.  The state of Texas argued that Medellin had forfeited 
his notification right by failing to comply with state rules on challenges to criminal convic-
tions.  Id. at 501–04. 
 188. See supra note 98.  
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Court interpreted the provisions of three international agreements.189  
The Court’s decision resulted from reading the treaties’ text and ex-
amining the context surrounding these agreements.190  The Court re-
frained from applying a purposive approach and only glancingly refe-
renced any of the relevant treaties’ purposes.191
Justice Breyer’s dissent, however, briefly touched on a purposive 
approach to treaty interpretation despite arguing that the case posed 
questions of domestic law only.  Specifically, Justice Breyer argued 
that the Court’s reference to treaty text was inappropriate for deter-
mining an issue that should only be resolved through reference to 
domestic case law.
 
192  Justice Breyer then suggested the Court’s resort 
to treaty interpretation would impact individual rights and have nega-
tive consequences in a globalized society.193
 
  Justice Breyer’s observa-
tion suggests a consideration of the wider implications of the Court’s 
interpretation; for example, how the interpretation impacts relations 
with other nations and the global protection of individual rights.   
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that a ne exeat right granted by a Chilean statute conveyed a Hague 
Convention custody right to a parent who otherwise held only access 
 
 189. Id. at 498–99.  The three agreements that the Court interpreted were (1) the Op-
tional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, which requires that 
Vienna Convention disputes be settled by ICJ, (2) the United Nations Charter, which 
creates an obligation for member states to comply with ICJ decisions, and (3) the ICJ Sta-
tute, which is an annex of the U.N. Charter and sets out the procedures for the ICJ.  Op-
tional Protocol, supra note 155; U.N. Charter art. 92, 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993, 3 Bevans 
1153 (1945); Statute of the International Court of Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, 3 
Bevans 1153, 1179 (1945) [hereinafter ICJ Statute].   
     190. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 523 (“Nothing in the text, background, negotiating and draft-
ing history, or practice among signatory nations suggests that the President or Senate in-
tended the improbable result of giving the judgments of an international tribunal a higher 
status than that enjoyed by ‘many of our most fundamental constitutional protections.’” 
(quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 360 (2006)).  This context included (1) 
the existence of other procedures to enforce ICJ decisions, id. at 507–08; (2) the executive 
branch’s view that the relevant provisions were not self-executing, id. at 513; (3) separation 
of powers concerns, id. at 516; and (4) the fact that no member states made ICJ decisions 
directly enforceable in their domestic courts, id. at 517.  
 191. See id. at 511 (describing the ICJ Statute’s “principal purpose” as dispute arbitra-
tion between national governments). 
 192. Id. at 549 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 193. Id. at 562 (“Hunting for what the text cannot contain, [the Court] takes a wrong 
turn.  It threatens to deprive individuals . . . of the workable dispute resolution procedures 
that many treaties . . . provide.  In a world where commerce, trade, and travel have become 
ever more international, that is a step in the wrong direction.”). 
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rights.194  The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy and 
joined by five other Justices,195 based its conclusion on a broad read-
ing of the Convention’s text.  The majority noted support for such a 
conclusion from the Convention’s objects and purposes, as well as 
from extratextual sources of interpretation.196  In contrast, the dis-
sent, by Justice Stevens,197 argued that the text of the Convention 
clearly and unambiguously indicated that ne exeat rights are access 
rights and to find otherwise would contradict the treaty’s purpose.198
 
   
A.  The Court Held That Ne Exeat Rights Constituted Custody Rights 
Under the Hague Convention  
The Hague Convention’s text provided the primary basis for the 
majority’s holding that ne exeat rights are custody rights.  The Court 
began with an analysis of the text, then discussed the extratextual 
sources supporting the Court’s reading of the text, and concluded by 
assessing the treaty’s objects and purposes.  In the reference to the 
extratextual sources and purposive analysis, the Court found support 
for its initial textually based conclusion that ne exeat rights are custody 
rights.   
The Court began its analysis by determining that the ne exeat 
right conveyed to Mr. Abbott by a Chilean statute gave him the right 
to jointly decide his son’s country of residence.199  The Court noted 
the Convention’s recognition of jointly held custody rights.200  The 
Court then concluded that, because the Hague Convention defines 
custody rights to include “the right to determine the child’s place of 
residence,” Mr. Abbott’s right to determine his son’s country of resi-
dence through his statutory ne exeat right constituted a joint custody 
right.201
 
 194. 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010). 
  The Court found dispositive Mr. Abbott’s power to deter-
mine his son’s residence, regardless of whether this power is to decide 
 195. Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, Alito, and Sotomayor joined in 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion.  Id. at 1987.   
 196. See infra Part III.A. 
 197. Justices Breyer and Thomas joined Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion.  Abbott, 130 
S. Ct. at 1997 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 198. See infra Part III.B.  
 199. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1990 (majority opinion).  The Court did not rely on the ne exeat 
order issued by the Chilean court in assessing whether ne exeat rights are custody rights, as 
this judicial order did not contain a parental-consent provision.  Id. at 1992.  The statutori-
ly granted ne exeat right does contain a parental-consent provision, which the Court found 
to be sufficient grounds for its reading of ne exeat rights as custody rights.  Id.   
 200. Id. at 1990 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 3(a)). 
 201. Id. at 1990–91 (citing Hague Convention, supra note 3, art. 5(a)). 
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a street address or the country where his son lives, because “deter-
mine” can be defined as setting limits and boundaries.202  After re-
cognizing that ne exeat rights may not fit within traditional ideas of 
custody rights, the Court emphasized that a “uniform, text-based ap-
proach [to treaty interpretation] ensures international consisten-
cy.”203
 The Court next turned to extratextual sources of treaty interpre-
tation and found these sources supported the Court’s textually based 
conclusions. First, the Court discussed the U.S. Department of State’s 
understanding of ne exeat rights as rights of custody.
     
204  After recogniz-
ing the “well-established canon of deference” to the executive 
branch’s interpretation, the Court found little reason to reject such 
deference in this case, where “the diplomatic consequences” of judi-
cial treaty interpretation might include adverse reactions by a treaty’s 
member states and impact U.S. efforts to reclaim children abducted 
from the United States.205  Second, the Court discussed the judicial 
decisions of six Hague Convention member states that all held ne exeat 
rights to be rights of custody under the Hague Convention.206  In its 
discussion of member-state interpretation, the Court emphasized 
again that “‘uniform international interpretation of the Convention’ 
is part of the Convention’s framework.”207  Third, the Court hig-
hlighted scholarly agreement finding an “emerging international 
consensus” for ne exeat rights as custody rights, citing several articles in 
support of this consensus.208  Additionally, the Court emphasized that 
the Pérez-Vera Report detailed a definition of custody rights that en-
compassed a broad, flexible interpretation of all possible rights of 
custody and reasoned that ne exeat rights fell under such an ap-
proach.209
Finally, the Court reasoned that the “objects and purposes” of 
the Hague Convention supported the Court’s textually based conclu-
   
 
 202. Id. at 1991. 
 203. Id.  According to the Court, such an approach prevents courts from relying on lo-
cal definitions or legal traditions, such as traditional ideas of custody.  Id. 
 204. Id. at 1993. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 1993–94 (referencing cases in Australia, United Kingdom, Israel, Austria, 
South Africa, and Germany).  The Court noted a split in the French courts, but mini-
mized, as factually distinct, the more restrictive view held by Canadian courts that ne exeat 
rights are access rights and not custody rights.  Id. at 1994. 
 207. Id. at 1993 (quoting ICARA, 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3) (2006)). 
 208. Id. at 1994–95. 
 209. Id. at 1995. 
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sion that ne exeat rights constitute custody rights.210  The Court recog-
nized that the Convention’s purpose is to prevent parents from seek-
ing friendlier forums outside the child’s country of habitual resi-
dence.211  The return of wrongfully removed children is a deterrent 
and remedy for such conduct.  Therefore, denial of a return remedy 
required by other countries—that is, return when the removing par-
ent violated ne exeat rights—would run counter to the Convention’s 
purpose.212
The Court concluded by noting that a parent with a ne exeat right 
has a custody right and may seek a judicial order requiring the child’s 
return to the country of habitual residence.
   
213  The Court empha-
sized, however, that this right to a return remedy is not absolute, as 
the Convention recognizes certain exceptions.214  The Court there-
fore reversed and remanded the case for further consideration by the 
lower court.215
 
 
B.  The Dissent Argued That the Convention’s Text and Purpose 
Unambiguously Indicate Ne Exeat Rights Are Access Rights, and 
Thus Consideration of Extratextual Sources Was Inappropriate  
Justice Stevens’s dissent began by distinguishing between Ms. 
Abbott’s and Mr. Abbott’s rights:  Ms. Abbott has “daily care and con-
trol” of the child, while Mr. Abbott has “only visitation rights.”216  The 
ne exeat right, the dissent stated, is a restriction on Ms. Abbott’s cus-
todial rights, but does not by itself constitute a custody right.217  Ac-
cording to the dissent, holding a restriction on custody rights to be a 
custody right in itself contradicts the Hague Convention’s text and 
purpose.218
The dissent then described the context in which the Convention 
was drafted and concluded that the Convention’s purpose was to re-
medy ongoing abuses by noncustodial parents seeking more favorable 
forums abroad.
   
219
 
 210. Id.  
  In the dissent’s view, the drafters determined that a 
 211. Id. at 1996. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 1997. 
 214. Id.  These exceptions include if the child would be exposed to physical or psycho-
logical harm, or if the child would be placed in an “intolerable situation.”  Id. 
 215. Id.  
 216. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 217. Id. at 1997–98. 
 218. Id. at 1998 (discussing the reasoning used by the majority). 
 219. Id. 
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child should be returned to her country of habitual residence when 
she was removed by a noncustodial parent; however, no remedy 
should be granted when a custodial parent removes a child from her 
country of habitual residence in violation of a non-custodial parent’s 
access rights.220  Return of a child, the dissent emphasized, was in-
tended only for custodial parents and not parents with mere access 
rights.221
The dissent then turned to the Convention’s text to support its 
reasoning.  It began by noting that custody rights are those rights re-
lating to the care of the child,
  
222  and found dispositive Mr. Abbott’s 
lack of affirmative power to affect his son’s care.223  The majority’s 
“broad reading” of the Convention text, the dissent noted, would de-
stroy the drafters’ distinction between custody rights and access 
rights, while also “convert[ing] every noncustodial parent” in Chile to 
a custodial parent because of the statutorily granted ne exeat provi-
sion.224
The dissent also rejected the majority’s separation of the right to 
determine a child’s “place of residence” from rights relating to the 
child’s care.
     
225  It reasoned that, under the Pérez-Vera Report, deter-
mining a child’s place of residence is an example of the rights relat-
ing to the child’s care.226  Accordingly, the dissent argued, determin-
ing the place of residence was an example of how to assess what types 
of rights a custodial parent has.227  Even if this clause is divisible from 
rights relating to care, the dissent then reasoned, a travel restriction is 
not an affirmative right to determine a child’s place of residence.228
Finally, the dissent argued that the Court’s reliance on extratex-
tual aids in interpretation, such as the executive branch’s interpreta-
tion and foreign court decisions, was inappropriate as the Conven-
tion’s language is unambiguous.
   
229  Even if the text had not been 
clear, the dissent reasoned, the Court gave too much weight to the 
executive branch’s interpretation.230
 
 220. Id.  
  The dissent similarly cautioned 
 221. Id.  
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1999–2000. 
 224. Id. at 2000. 
 225. Id. at 2001. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 2006–07. 
 230. Id. at 2007.  The dissent noted that great weight is given to the executive branch’s 
interpretation in the following three instances: (1) in avoidance of international conflict, 
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against “substitut[ing]” foreign court interpretations for U.S. court 
interpretations when insufficient consensus existed among those for-
eign court decisions and factual distinctions existed between cases.231  
Thus the dissent found the Court’s reading of the Convention to be 
atextual and at odds with the Convention’s purpose.232
 
 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
The Abbott case provides insight into the post-Rehnquist Court’s 
approach to treaty interpretation.  Such insight is needed as increas-
ing globalization and treaties impact domestic law.233  Among the 
most interesting aspects of Abbott is the seeming revival of the canons 
of good faith and liberal interpretation, at least for interpretation of 
purely private-law treaties.234  Another intriguing aspect of Abbott is the 
Court’s rejection of the requirement for textual ambiguity as a trigger 
to reference extratextual sources of interpretation.235  These two 
points suggest an evolution in the Court’s treaty-interpretation ap-
proach in a global twenty-first century.  In addition, the Court also 
missed an opportunity to distinguish between treaty and statutory in-
terpretation and thereby reduce lower courts’ misconceptions on 
treaty interpretation.236
 
 
A.  Abbott v. Abbott Suggests a Revival of Good Faith and Liberal 
Interpretation in Purely Private-Law Treaties 
Abbott represents the first pure treaty-interpretation decision by 
the post-Rehnquist Supreme Court.  This status alone justifies an ex-
amination of the Court’s approach.  The significance of this case is 
further enhanced by the Court’s reference to the Hague Conven-
tion’s “objects and purposes.”  The Abbott Court’s use of this phrase is 
the first substantive reference in over seventy years to this signal of 
 
(2) when the executive branch’s interpretation is particularly illuminating, and (3) if the 
executive branch’s postratification conduct gives greater understanding of ambiguous 
treaty terms.  Id. at 2007–08.  According to the dissent, however, these circumstances did 
not apply to the current case.  Id. at 2008.  The dissent also cautioned against “abdi-
cat[ing]” to the executive the judicial responsibility to interpret treaty language.  Id.  
 231. Id. at 2008–09. 
 232. Id. at 2010. 
 233. Sullivan, supra note 157, at 781 (“As the substantive field covered by treaties grows, 
the importance of treaties as instruments of domestic law is enhanced.”). 
 234. See infra Part IV.A. 
 235. See infra Part IV.B. 
 236. See infra Part IV.C. 
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good faith and liberal interpretation.237  Such a reference suggests a 
revival of these two canons of interpretation or at least an endorse-
ment of a purposive approach to treaty interpretation.  A comparison 
with the post-Rehnquist Court’s previous three treaty cases, however, 
suggests that any revival of good faith and liberal interpretation likely 
is limited to purely private-law treaty cases.238
 
   
1. Reviving Good Faith and Liberal Interpretation Through 
Reference to a Treaty’s “Objects and Purposes”  
Among the most significant statements in Abbott, at least from a 
treaty-interpretation perspective, is the Court’s reference to the Ha-
gue Convention’s objects and purposes.  Specifically, the Court stated 
that “[a]dopting the view that the Convention provides a return re-
medy for violations of ne exeat rights accords with its objects and purpos-
es.”239  In the long history of Supreme Court treaty jurisprudence, 
such a statement is hardly revolutionary.240  In fact, such a purposive 
approach was common in the Court’s treaty jurisprudence through-
out the first half of the twentieth century.241  The significance of the 
Abbott Court’s statement lies instead in the fact that recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence largely ignored good faith and liberal interpreta-
tion and rarely referenced a treaty’s objects and purposes.242
The Abbott decision represents the Supreme Court’s first substan-
tive reference to a treaty’s “objects and purposes” in seventy years.  A 
review of the Supreme Court decisions from 1940 to 2010
 
243
 
 237. See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 identifies 
 238. See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 239. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 240. See, e.g., Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912) (stating that treaties “are 
to be read in the light of the conditions and circumstances existing at the time they were 
entered into, with a view to effecting the objects and purposes” of the member states); Sul-
livan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 440 (1921) (rejecting a party’s argument as “inconsistent with 
the general purpose and object” of the relevant treaty). 
 241. See supra notes 106–118 and accompanying text. 
 242. Cf. Van Alstine, Treaties in the Supreme Court, supra note 112, at 215 (noting that the 
Court referred to “substantive liberal interpretation canon in only one opinion [United 
States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353 (1989)] over the last sixty years”). 
 243. The author conducted multiple searches in Westlaw and Lexis to determine 
whether the Supreme Court referenced a treaty’s “objects and purposes” in decisions is-
sued between January 1, 1940, and December 31, 2010.  In Lexis, the author used the 
search terms “object w/2 purpose” to search within (1) the core term (treaty), (2) the 
treaty interpretation subtopic of the international law topic, and (3) the results of a “treaty 
interpretation” natural language search.  In Westlaw, the author used the terms “object 
and purpose” to search within (1) the treaties headnote and subtopic of construction and 
operation, (2) the Supreme Court Cases (“SCT”) database, and (3) decisions located by a 
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only six decisions that reference a treaty’s “objects and purposes.”244  
Similarly, a targeted review of the last twenty years reveals little effort 
by the Court to pursue a purposive approach in treaty interpreta-
tion.245  In fact, during the period of 1982 to 2010, references to a 
treaty’s “purpose” are used most often as alternate language for de-
scribing the treaty drafters’ intent.246
The Court referenced a treaty’s objects and purposes in six deci-
sions from 1940 to 2010, and those references were marginal and, for 
the most part, contradictory to good faith and liberal interpretation.  
Three of these decisions use the language of “objects and purposes” 
to bolster an argument for textualism in treaty interpretation.  For 
example, the Sanchez-Llamas decision quoted the Restatement (Third) 
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States, which states that a trea-
ty should be interpreted according to its object and purpose, to sup-
port the Court’s statement that interpretation was based on the terms 
of the treaty.
  
247
 
Di (treaty) search in the SCT database.  As of April 25, 2011, six decisions referenced “ob-
jects and purposes.” 
  The Sanchez-Llamas Court continued by cautioning 
against “supplementing” the treaty’s terms and cited the historic pre-
cedence of The Amiable Isabella as authority that a domestic court 
 244. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1987)); Sale v. Hai-
tian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 372–73 
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 332); Volkswagenwerk Aktienge-
sellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Rocca, 
223 U.S. at 331–32); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 
(1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Rocca, 223 U.S. at 331–32); Maximov v. United 
States, 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963). 
 245. David Sloss, in an empirical analysis of U.S. treaty-interpretation approaches, de-
termined that between 1970 and 2006 there were approximately thirty-five U.S. Supreme 
Court decisions that substantively addressed treaty analysis.  See Sloss, supra note 122, at 
514–17.  The author of this Note examined the text of those Supreme Court decisions oc-
curring in the last twenty-eight years (1982 to 2010, which included approximately twenty-
five cases referenced by Sloss, as well as the 2008 case, Medellin v. Texas) to see whether the 
Court included a discussion of the relevant treaties’ purpose and, if yes, how purpose was 
described by the Court.   
 246. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 499 (2008) (referencing the preamble of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights in order to describe what the drafters in-
tended for the treaty’s purpose); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 407 (1985) (describing a 
provision of the Montreal Agreement as representing the drafters’ intent “to speed settle-
ment and facilitate passenger recovery”); El Al Israel Airlines v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 169 
(1999) (describing the purpose of the Warsaw Convention as providing uniform rules to 
govern air transportation claims, as demonstrated by the preamble of the treaty). 
 247. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325(1) (1986)) (“The United States ratified the 
[Vienna] Convention [on Consular Relations] with the expectation that it would be inter-
preted according to its terms.”).  
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should not “amend” a treaty through its interpretation.248  Similarly, 
in United States v. Stuart, Justice Scalia cited in his concurrence the 
principle of effectuating a treaty’s “objects and purposes,” yet rejected 
any inquiry that examined the “intent or expectations of the signato-
ries beyond those expressed in the text” when the text was unambi-
guous.249  In Trans World Airlines, Inc. Justice Stevens followed a similar 
approach in his dissent, referencing a treaty’s “objects and purposes” 
while arguing for interpretation based on the “literal meaning” of the 
treaty’s text.250
The remaining three cases referencing “objects and purposes” al-
so failed to embrace good faith and liberal interpretation.  For exam-
ple, Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft 
v. Schlunk focused on the treaty’s purpose rather than its text, but still 
failed to apply the “objects and purposes” reference consistently with 
good faith and liberal interpretation.
   
251  Specifically, Justice Brennan 
used the Court’s “duty to read the Convention ‘with a view to effect-
ing the objects and purposes of the States thereby contracting’” to 
question the majority’s failure to interpret the treaty consistently with 
its primary purpose.252  Yet this reference focused on analyzing the 
drafters’ intent rather than as a flexible, forward-looking standard of 
interpretation embracing liberal protection of treaty-granted rights.  
The fifth and earliest of these cases, Maximov v. United States, flatly re-
jected the petitioner’s argument to consider the treaty’s objects and 
purposes and instead relied simply on the plain meaning of the text 
to interpret the treaty.253  In the last case, Sale v. Haitian Centers Coun-
cil, Inc., the Court referenced treaty “objects and purposes” when de-
scribing the lower court’s interpretation of the United Nations Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees.254
 
 248. Id. (quoting The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (Story, J.) 
(“[T]o alter, amend, or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, 
important or trivial, would be on our part an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of 
judicial functions.  It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty.” (alteration in origi-
nal)). 
  The Court’s own inter-
 249. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 372–73.      
 250. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 262 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens emphasized that “the literal meaning” takes prece-
dence in treaty interpretation.  Id. 
 251. 486 U.S. 694, 711 (1988) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
 252. Id. (quoting Rocca v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317, 331–32 (1912)). 
 253. 373 U.S. 49, 52 (1963) (rejecting petitioner’s argument that the “purposes and ob-
jectives” of the Income Tax Convention between the United States and the United King-
dom require tax exemption for trust beneficiaries because the petitioner’s argument 
would result in an outcome “contrary” to the language of the treaty). 
 254. 509 U.S. 155, 169 (1993). 
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interpretation, however, focused on the drafters’ intent rather than 
taking a purposive approach.255
In contrast to these six cases, the Abbott decision not only refe-
renced the objects and purposes of the Hague Convention but pro-
ceeded to take a purposive approach to justify its conclusion that ne 
exeat rights are rights of custody.  The Court first based its conclusion 
on a plain reading of the treaty’s text and the drafters’ intent.
 
256  The 
Court then stated that “[a]dopting the view that the Convention pro-
vides a return remedy for violations of ne exeat rights accords with its 
objects and purposes.”257  The Court emphasized that treating ne exeat 
rights as custody rights is consistent with the foundational principle of 
a child’s best interests and the Convention’s purpose to deter child 
abductions by parents seeking “a friendlier forum.”258  Ultimately, the 
Court suggested that the Convention’s objects and purposes are to 
prevent “devastating consequences” to an abducted child.259  The 
Court did not reference the Convention itself for this reasoning, 
though the Convention preamble clearly recognizes the child’s inter-
ests as “paramount” and seeks to prevent abduction.260  Instead, the 
Court focused on the potential harmful consequences to the ab-
ducted child in the event the child remains with the abductor.261
The Court’s purposive approach to the Hague Convention’s in-
terpretation is particularly interesting given the understanding of the 
abduction problem at the time of the Convention’s drafting com-
pared with the reality of abductions as it is understood today.  The 
Hague Convention drafters intended to remedy child abductions in-
volving noncustodial fathers taking a child abroad.
 
262  However, ab-
duction by a custodial mother is now the more frequent abduction 
scenario.263
In general, the Abbott Court’s use of “objects and purposes” sug-
gests a renewed willingness by the Court to consider aspects of the 
  Given these changing circumstances, a purposive ap-
proach to treaty interpretation appropriately allowed the Court to 
consider the evolving family context at the heart of these cases and to 
address the complication of ne exeat rights. 
 
 255. Id. at 183.  
 256. See supra Part III.A. 
 257. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1995 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 258. Id. at 1995–96. 
 259. Id. at 1996. 
 260. Hague Convention, supra note 3, pmbl. 
 261. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1996. 
 262. BEAUMONT & MCELEAVY, supra note 57, at 3–4. 
 263. Id. 
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good faith and liberal interpretation canons in some treaty cases.  
This usage, however, is seemingly at odds with the treaty cases imme-
diately preceding Abbott, as discussed in the next section.   
 
2.  Any Revival of Good Faith and Liberal Interpretation Is Limited 
to Purely Private-Law Treaty Cases, and Not Extended to Private-
Law Treaty Cases Involving U.S. Sovereign Obligations  
A comparison between Abbott and the post-Rehnquist Court’s ear-
lier treaty-related cases suggests that any revival of good faith and lib-
eral interpretation is limited to purely private-law treaties.  Absent 
from the previous three cases of Sanchez-Llamas, Hamdan, and Medellin 
is Abbott’s unique reference to “objects and purposes,” as well as a 
purposive approach to interpretation.  Although Medellin and Sanchez-
Llamas make minor references to treaty purpose, these decisions fo-
cused on member-state intent at the time of drafting rather than as-
sessing whether the treaty’s objects and purposes accord with an in-
terpretation more protective of the affected individual’s rights and 
the shared understanding of member states.264  Also absent from the 
three previous decisions is a consideration of the potential ramifica-
tions of the decision on individual rights, specifically the rights of U.S. 
citizens abroad.265
The distinction in interpretation philosophy is likely premised on 
the fact that Abbott is a “purely” private-law treaty case while its three 
predecessors involved private-law treaty cases implicating sovereign 
obligations.  A “purely” private-law treaty case requires that a court in-
terpret a treaty to determine the distribution of private individual 
rights.
  In contrast, Abbott embraced a purposive interpre-
tation that protected individual rights and sought uniformity with the 
international understanding of the treaty.   
266  In contrast, private-law treaty cases implicating sovereign ob-
ligations address how government actors or domestic laws affect pri-
vate individual rights.267
 
 264. See supra Parts II.B.3.a, II.B.3.c.  
 
 265. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 1993 (discussing the potential impact of its interpretation on 
the U.S. Department of State’s ability to reclaim children wrongfully removed from the 
United States).  But see Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 537 & n.4  (2008) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) (referencing an Oklahoma decision to commute a death sentence in response to 
the ICJ Avena decision, in part out of an interest in protecting U.S. citizens abroad); San-
chez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 398 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing pro-
tection of U.S. citizens abroad as one of the Vienna Convention’s purposes and stressing 
that improper treaty interpretation can lessen the fair treatment of these same citizens 
abroad). 
 266. See supra note 161. 
 267. See infra notes 275–279 and accompanying text. 
MaddenFinalBookProof 3/14/2012  11:48 AM 
2012] ABBOTT v. ABBOTT 611 
Distinguishing between purely private-law treaties and private-law 
treaties implicating sovereign obligations for the purpose of treaty in-
terpretation is a reality in U.S. courts.268  A recent empirical study by 
David Sloss indicated that courts are more likely to take a treaty-
interpretation approach that recognizes and defers to the political 
branches when the case involves private parties opposing U.S. gov-
ernment actors.269  Medellin, Hamdan, and Sanchez-Llamas all fall into 
this category.  In contrast, Sloss found that purely private-law treaty 
cases, like Abbott, are more likely to result in interpretations consistent 
with international understandings.270
Such distinctions likely result from the reality of treaty enforce-
ment.  Protection of purely private rights requires reciprocity between 
contracting parties.
  
271  For the Hague Convention cases, the individu-
al right to a return remedy depends on cooperation among the au-
thorities in the country from which and to which a child was wrong-
fully removed.272
 
 268. Cf. Sloss, supra note 
  Therefore, a judicial decision interpreting this 
purely private-law treaty is the only avenue for ensuring that disputed 
rights are protected.  The goal of private-law treaties is to establish un-
iformity in private law, and a purposive approach aids courts in reach-
122, at 504 (stating that “[a]nalysis of judicial decision making 
in treaty cases is problematic because U.S. courts apply two mutually inconsistent models,” 
which are “nationalist” and “transnationalist”).   
 269. Id. at 504–05.  Sloss terms such an approach the “nationalist” model, which holds 
“that only self-executing treaties have the force of law, that courts should interpret treaties 
in accordance with the shared understanding of the U.S. political branches, and that there 
is a background presumption that treaties do not create judicially enforceable individual 
rights.”  Id. at 504. 
 270. Id.  Sloss calls this approach the “transnationalist” model, which holds “that treaties 
generally have the force of law in the United States, that courts should interpret a treaty in 
accordance with the internationally agreed understanding of its terms, and that individu-
als are ordinarily entitled to judicial remedies for violations of their treaty-based individual 
rights.”  Id.  
 271. Ann Laquer Estin, Families Across Borders: The Hague Children’s Conventions and the 
Case for International Family Law in the United States, 62 FLA. L. REV. 47, 52 (2010) (stating 
that the efficacy of the Hague Convention “depends on a strong principle of reciprocity 
between contracting states”).  But see id. at 49 (suggesting that the Hague Convention may 
be a “hybrid of public and private international law . . . depend[ing] on . . . cooperation of 
government authorities in contracting states”). 
 272. Cf. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, REPORT ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE HAGUE CONVENTION 
ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION 6 (2010), available at 
http://travel.state.gov/pdf/2010ComplianceReport.pdf (describing U.S. Department of 
State coordination with the central authorities in other countries and reporting that, of 
the 436 children returned to the United States after being “abducted to or wrongfully re-
tained in other countries,” the Hague Convention member states returned 324, or 74 per-
cent, of these children to the United States). 
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ing decisions consistent with prevailing international private law.273  
Also relevant is a belief that such individual adjudications have li-
mited policy impacts.274
In contrast, private-law treaties implicating sovereign obligations 
can stretch beyond concern for an individual’s rights and can en-
compass a country’s stance on international law
   
275 or a broader policy 
conflict.276  For example, the Court in United States v. Alvarez-Machain 
determined that U.S. agents’ abduction of a Mexican national did not 
violate a bilateral extradition treaty with Mexico despite submission of 
an amicus brief by Mexico stating that Mexico’s interpretation of the 
treaty held such an abduction to be a breach of the treaty.277  The 
Court’s decision allowed the U.S. government to take a contrarian 
view of international law to benefit U.S. interests.278  Similarly, the 
Medellin Court focused less on the implications of interpretation and 
more on the domestic conflict among U.S. laws and separation of 
powers.279
Concerns relating to separation of powers and a belief that ex-
ecutive branch diplomacy is better-suited to resolving conflicts be-
tween sovereigns are legitimate.
   
280
 
 273. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 
  However, resolution of treaty dis-
putes involves not just the adjudication of individual rights in dispute 
106, at 1892 (noting the “rapid ex-
pansion of private-law treaties designed to secure international uniformity”).  But see Be-
derman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1015 (suggesting that a search for a treaty’s 
purpose may lead to a subjective and “standardless” assessment). 
 274. See Sloss, supra note 122, at 505 (“In litigation between private parties, there is little 
risk of creating friction between the judicial and executive branches . . . .”). 
 275. See, e.g., Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1011 (suggesting that in 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) the Supreme Court willingly colluded 
with the U.S. government to violate a treaty obligation). 
 276. See, e.g., David J. Bederman, Agora: Medellin: Medellin’s New Paradigm for Treaty In-
terpretation, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 539–40 (2008) [hereinafter Bederman, Agora] (recog-
nizing the “high-profile federalism conflict” and separation-of-powers concerns present in 
Medellin). 
 277. 504 U.S. 655, 657, 675 n.14 (1992).  
 278. Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1013 (recognizing that the result of 
Alvarez-Machain was to allow the United States to maintain “a peculiar view as to a back-
ground principle of customary international law”).   
 279. Bederman, Agora, supra note 276, at 539 (suggesting that Medellin, which may only 
be “tangentially about treaty interpretation,” focused on conflicts between state criminal 
procedures and federal foreign-relations concerns, as well as separation of powers).  
 280. See Sloss, supra note 122, at 505 (“[I]n cases where private parties are adverse to 
government actors, the private parties are generally invoking a treaty as a constraint on 
executive action.  In these circumstances, courts might create friction with the executive 
branch if they zealously pursued the goal of treaty compliance.”).  See also United States v. 
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 669 n.16 (1992) (lauding “[t]he advantage of the diplo-
matic approach to the resolution of difficulties between two sovereign nations, as opposed 
to unilateral action by the courts of one nation . . . .”). 
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or cross-border diplomacy but also implicates the unique nature of 
treaties as shared obligations among nations.281  A court’s failure to 
recognize the shared obligations of member states risks judicial 
breaches of treaties, which may impact a broader set of individual 
rights and diplomatic relations than those currently before the court.  
The canons of good faith and liberal interpretation recognize this 
unique nature of treaties and guard against judicial breaches.282
A revival of good faith and liberal interpretation would provide a 
unifying interpretive philosophy for lower courts and guard against 
inadvertent treaty breaches.  The Abbott decision suggests the Court’s 
willingness to revive a unifying theme of interpretation at least for 
purely private-law treaties.  Such an approach may reduce lower-court 
confusion over the unique role of treaties in domestic law.
  Such 
safeguards are as relevant today as they were a century ago.   
283  Medellin, 
Hamdan, and Sanchez-Llamas indicate, however, that application of 
good faith and liberal interpretation is likely limited to purely private-
law treaty cases.  Unfortunately, this dichotomy in interpretation will 
continue the “schizophrenic attitude toward treaty cases” that charac-
terized treaty law in the latter half of the twentieth century,284
 
 and 
likely limit any clarification that the purposive approach might other-
wise provide were it more widely accepted.     
B.  Abbott Allows Reference to Extratextual Sources for Treaty 
Interpretation Regardless of Lack of Ambiguity in the Treaty’s Text 
Abbott’s implicit rejection of textual ambiguity as a trigger for ref-
erence to extratextual sources in treaty interpretation should con-
clude the debate on the use of these sources initiated nearly thirty 
years ago.  This rejection is consistent with treaty interpretation 
precedent and recognizes the unique nature of treaties.  The rejec-
tion of ambiguity resulted from the Court’s interpretive approach to 
the Hague Convention.  In deciding whether ne exeat rights constitute 
rights of custody under the Hague Convention, the Court began with 
 
 281. Carlos M. Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1082, 1082 (1992) (recognizing that treaties, “[a]s instruments of international 
law, . . . establish obligations with which international law requires the parties to comply”). 
 282. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1888 (stating that the doctrine of 
good faith “served to remind courts of the special international law origins of treaties, of 
their fundamental difference with purely domestic legal norms, and of the need to show 
sensitivity for the views of our nation’s treaty partners”). 
 283. Id. at 1887 (suggesting that “confusion in the lower courts” is “the consequence” of 
“a rudderless drift in treaty interpretation”). 
 284. Sloss, supra note 122, at 553 (stating that U.S. courts manifest such an attitude in 
domestic litigation). 
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an examination of the treaty’s text and from this concluded that ne 
exeat rights are rights of custody.285  The Court then turned to extra-
textual sources to “support” and “inform” its textually based conclu-
sion that Mr. Abbott has a right of custody by virtue of his statutory ne 
exeat right.286
The Court’s ability to conclude from the Hague Convention’s 
text that ne exeat rights are rights of custody implies that the Court 
found the treaty’s text to be unambiguous.  Yet, despite finding that 
the treaty’s text clearly supported its interpretation, the Court refe-
renced extratextual sources and thereby disregarded recent Rehn-
quist Court cases requiring ambiguity for reference to extratextual 
aids in interpretation.
   
287  Justice Stevens questioned this approach in 
his Abbott dissent, noting that “the Court turns to authority we utilize 
to aid us in interpreting ambiguous treaty text” even though “the 
Convention’s language is plain.”288
Despite Justice Stevens’s dissent, the Court’s reference to extra-
textual sources as confirmation of its textual reading is consistent with 
precedent and with the unique nature of treaties.  Chan v. Korean Air 
Lines, Ltd.
   
289 and United States v. Stuart290 provide the primary authori-
ty291 for ambiguity as a trigger to reference extratextual sources.  Inte-
restingly, little mention is made of ambiguity as a trigger in treaty-
interpretation cases preceding and following Chan and Stuart.  From 
Choctaw292 to Medellin,293
 
 285. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990–93 (2010). 
 the Court recognized that the unique nature 
 286. Id. at 1993 (observing, among other things, that the Court’s conclusion “is sup-
ported and informed by the State Department’s view on the issue” and “ is further in-
formed by the views of other contracting states”). 
 287. See supra text accompanying notes 139–146. 
 288. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. at 2006–07 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Sumitomo Shoji Am., 
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)).  Justice Stevens’s use of Sumitomo is odd.  Jus-
tice Stevens cites Sumitomo as the authority supporting textual ambiguity as a trigger for 
use of extratextual sources to aid treaty interpretation.  The language cited in Sumitomo, 
however, focuses not on ambiguity but instead on whether the treaty language is inconsis-
tent with signatory intent or expectations.  See Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 180 (“The clear im-
port of treaty language controls ‘unless application of the words of the treaty according to 
their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its 
signatories.’” (quoting Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49, 54 (1963)).   
 289. 490 U.S. 122 (1989). 
 290. 489 U.S. 353 (1989). 
 291. In turn, these cases cite as authority Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392 (1985), and 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988).  Yet neither of these cases 
clearly state that ambiguity is the trigger.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 292. Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943). 
 293. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).   
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of treaties as a “shared agreement among sovereign powers”294 war-
rants use of extratextual sources to ensure that the treaty drafters’ in-
tent is followed and judicial breaches of treaty obligations are 
avoided.295  Reference to such sources is not akin to amending a trea-
ty, as suggested in the Chan opinion.296  Instead, judicial consideration 
of these extratextual sources is well within the “just rules of interpre-
tation” referenced by Justice Story nearly two centuries ago.297
C.  Abbott v. Abbott Represents a Missed Opportunity by the Supreme 
Court to Distinguish Treaty from Statutory Interpretation 
  Refer-
ence to extratextual sources, regardless of treaty ambiguity, allows a 
court to confirm its interpretation by referencing international prac-
tice.  This ensures a good-faith interpretation in accordance with the 
treaty’s purpose.  Such an approach recognizes the unique nature of 
treaties and limits judicial breaches of treaty obligations.   
Abbott, as one of the few recent Supreme Court decisions dedi-
cated solely to treaty interpretation, gave the Court an opportunity to 
definitively remove treaty interpretation from the ideological debate 
embroiling statutory interpretation.  The Court failed to take this op-
portunity when it repeated Medellin’s statement that “[t]he interpreta-
tion of a treaty, like the interpretation of a statute, begins with its 
text,”298 yet omitted Medellin’s subsequent reference to the unique na-
ture of treaties.299
 
 294. Id. at 507. 
  Instead, the Court’s incomplete statement suggests 
 295. See Choctaw, 318 U.S. at 431–32 (recognizing that the unique nature of treaties 
supports “look[ing] beyond the written words to the history of the treaty, the negotiations, 
and the practical construction adopted by the parties”); Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (stating 
that, because a treaty “is an agreement among sovereign powers,” consideration of “nego-
tiation and drafting history” and “postratification understanding of signatory nations” is 
appropriate (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted)). 
 296. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989) (stating that while draft-
ing history “may of course be consulted to elucidate a text that is ambiguous, . . . . where 
the text is clear, as it is here, we have no power to insert an amendment” (citation omit-
ted)). 
 297. See In re The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1, 71 (1821) (“We are to find out 
the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the subject matter; 
and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes, and to stop where that 
stops—whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties which it leaves behind.”). 
 298. Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1990 (2010).  The dissent also referenced the 
Medellin statement.  Id. at 1999 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
 299. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Because a treaty 
ratified by the United States is an agreement among sovereign powers, we have also consi-
dered as aids to its interpretation the negotiation and drafting history of the treaty as well 
as the postratification understanding of signatory nations.”).    
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an inapt analogy between two disparate canons of interpretation.300  
Such an analogy provides little guidance to lower courts, which al-
ready appear to meld these two canons of interpretation.301
Similar omissions have occurred before.
 
302  Other Supreme 
Court cases that omitted this crucial distinction between treaties and 
statutes were subsequently used by lower courts as the basis for relying 
on statutory construction tools and theories to interpret treaties.303  
For example, Croll v. Croll cited the 1992 Supreme Court case United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain as an introduction to the Second Circuit’s in-
terpretation of the Hague Convention.304  The Croll court then relied 
on “American lexical sources” and domestic law understandings to in-
terpret what constitutes a custody right under the Hague Conven-
tion.305  The dissent appropriately questioned such an approach, not-
ing that the unique nature of a treaty “requires [looking] beyond 
parochial definitions to the broader meaning” of that treaty.306
Treaties arise out of an international consensus process that al-
lows few opportunities to correct misguided domestic interpretations 
by member states.
  Such 
failures to look to the broader international context demonstrate why 
textualism and other statutory approaches are ill suited to treaty in-
terpretation.   
307
 
 300. See Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 
  Such a result contrasts starkly with interpreta-
tion of domestic statutes, for which the legislative process provides 
106, at 1887 (highlighting the Su-
preme Court’s “rhetorical ambiguity” and inattention as reasons for lower court confusion 
in treaty interpretation). 
 301. See id. at 1921–22 (recognizing that, in recent cases, lower courts explicitly com-
ment on a presumed similarity between treaty and statutory interpretation and that this 
conduct is the result of the Supreme Court’s ambiguity and silence on the distinction be-
tween two different canons of interpretation). 
 302. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992) (stating “[i]n 
construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its 
meaning,” and omitting any language distinguishing between the two canons of interpre-
tation). 
 303. See, e.g., Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 136, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing United 
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 663 (1992)) (referencing Alvarez-Machain before 
looking to domestic usage to define custody rights as they pertain to the Hague Conven-
tion), abrogated by Abbott v. Abbott, 130 S. Ct. 1983 (2010). 
 304. Id. at 136. 
 305. Id. at 138–39. 
 306. Id. at 145 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 307. Van Alstine, Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1927 (footnote omitted) (em-
phasizing that the consensual nature of treaties can make “renegotiation . . . difficult 
and . . . practically impossible for multilateral treaties”).     
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opportunity to correct unintended judicial interpretations.308  Treaty 
drafters and the domestic courts that eventually interpret the treaties 
bring different legal and linguistic traditions to the tasks of creating 
and implementing these international agreements.309  The intended 
meaning of terms used in treaties can be distinct from the meaning 
applied to those same terms by domestic law.310  Errors in interpreta-
tion, therefore, may occur when domestic courts apply statutory con-
struction tools, such as textualism, to a treaty.311  A textualist approach 
would ignore, inter alia, member state intent at drafting as well as post-
ratification understanding of the treaty.312  Instead, as Justice Scalia 
recently noted, “considerable respect” should be given to judicial in-
terpretations by member states as “[o]therwise the whole object of the 
treaty, which is to establish a single, agreed-upon regime governing 
the actions of all the signatories, will be frustrated.”313
Despite the Supreme Court’s acceptance of the distinction be-
tween treaty and statutory interpretation,
 
314 statutory approaches con-
tinue to influence lower court interpretations of treaties.315
 
 308. See Bederman, Revivalist Cannons, supra note 
  This 
trend is likely to continue if the Court fails to make use of decisions 
like Abbott to distinguish treaty interpretation from statutes.  This 
101, at 1022–24 (comparing the legis-
lative process of statutes with the consensual process of treaties, and noting that, in this 
consensual process “there is no guarantee that a reconciliation could occur”). 
 309. See Michael P. Van Alstine, Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 704 
(1998) (recognizing that the “adjudicators charged with filling in gaps and resolving am-
biguities are themselves products of differing cultural, legal, and political traditions”). 
 310. See Van Alstine Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1928 (recognizing that the 
distinct international legal system from which treaties result means that “treaties must be 
interpreted free from the influence of norms of a purely domestic origin”). 
 311. See Bederman, Revivalist Cannons, supra note 101, at 1022–23 (cautioning against 
applying statutory interpretation to treaties because of the concern, among others, that 
the two lawmaking processes are distinct). 
 312. But cf. Van Alstine Death of Good Faith, supra note 106, at 1929 (“More specifically, 
through the recent emphasis on shared intent and explicit reliance on drafting history 
and subsequent agreed practice, the Court has seemingly accepted that the judicial appli-
cation of treaties requires the application of independent interpretive principles.”) 
 313. Antonin G. Scalia, Assoc. J., Supreme Court of the United States, Keynote Address 
at the Ninety-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: For-
eign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (April 2, 2004), in “A DECENT RESPECT TO THE 
OPINIONS OF MANKIND…”: SELECTED SPEECHES BY JUSTICES OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
ON FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 110–11 (Christopher J. Borgen ed., 2007). 
 314. Cf. Bederman, Agora, supra note 276, at 540 (“The proxy bouts of old—in which 
treaty interpretation cases were used as a form of ‘shadowboxing’ for the ‘main event’ of 
statutory construction jurisprudence—are now at an end. . . . A new eclecticism in the se-
lection of extrinsic sources for treaty interpretation is confirmed.”). 
 315. Bederman, Revivalist Canons, supra note 101, at 1019–20 (highlighting, in a survey 
of Rehnquist-era treaty interpretation cases, that “recent trends in treaty construction have 
been subliminally influenced by currents in the statutory interpretation debate”). 
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melding of doctrines by lower courts may cause serious consequences 
in U.S. international relations as the lower court confusion risks judi-
cial breaches in international obligations.316
 
  Abbott thus represents a 
missed opportunity in which the Supreme Court could have provided 
better guidance to treaty interpretation for the lower courts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Abbott v. Abbott, the Supreme Court of the United States prop-
erly held a child’s removal from Chile to Texas to be a violation of 
custody rights under the Hague Convention.317  In so holding, the 
Court demonstrated two significant aspects of treaty interpretation 
and missed one opportunity.  First, the Court applied a purposive ap-
proach consistent with good faith and liberal interpretation and the-
reby signaled a revival of these long dormant canons of interpreta-
tion.318  Second, the Court rejected ambiguity as a trigger for 
reference to extratextual aids in interpretation.319  Third and finally, 
the Court missed an opportunity to highlight the unique nature of 
treaties and reduce lower court confusion about the similarities be-
tween treaty and statutory interpretation.320
 
   
 
 316. Cf. Vázquez, supra note 281, at 1082 (“As instruments of international law, [trea-
ties] establish obligations with which international law requires the parties to comply.”). 
 317. 130 S. Ct. 1983, 1993 (2010). 
 318. See supra Part IV.A. 
 319. See supra Part IV.B. 
 320. See supra Part IV.C. 
